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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The process of collective bargaining emerged as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution. 
It was developed as way in which workers could act together in order to attain greater 
bargaining power and protect their interests and job security more effectively. The process 
was initially very unpopular as it was seen as a threat to an employer’s ability to make profit 
and as a process which contravened basic contractual principles. However, over time 
perceptions started to change and collective bargaining became more acceptable. Its 
popularity gradually grew and collective bargaining eventually became a standard feature of 
industrial relations systems in many industrialised market economies across the world. In fact 
its recognition, implementation and promotion have become so widespread in modern times 
that the bargaining process can be accurately described as a global phenomenon. 
 
Two important factors that have contributed significantly to the almost universal 
acceptance of the bargaining process as a means of determining terms and conditions of 
employment. The first relates to the array of different functions served by collective 
bargaining and the second to the inherent features of the process, namely flexibility and 
adaptability. These factors have ensured that collective bargaining is actively pursued as a 
regulatory tool in industrial relations and that states implement measures and legislative 
frameworks which encourage and promote its use although in different forms and to different 
extents. This has given  rise to various models of collective bargaining.  
 
This paper sets out to examine in greater detail four of the more popular bargaining 
models that have emerged as mechanisms to regulate and promote bargaining collectively. 
This will be done with reference to five specific countries implementing either one or a 
combination of these models. The five countries that will be looked at are: The United States 
of America, Canada, Germany, Austria and South Africa. These bargaining regimes will be 
examined and comparatively analysed which will provide useful insight into the operation of 
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the different approaches, their advantages and disadvantages, the policy choices behind their 
implementation and how they are designed to address specific economic, political and social 
factors  
 
The methodology of this paper will be to firstly set out the features that have made the 
process of collective bargaining what it is today. Secondly, the four different bargaining 
models dealt with by this paper will be briefly set out and discussed. Thirdly, collective 
bargaining in terms of the International Labour Organisation will be looked at. Fourthly, the 
duty to bargain as found in the compulsory model of collective bargaining will be explained 
which will be followed by an exploration of the bargaining regimes of two countries adhering 
to this approach. Finally the different voluntary models will be dealt with.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
CHAPTER 2:  THE FUNCTIONS AND INHERENT FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
 
2.1 The Functions of Collective Bargaining 
Collective bargaining has become one of the most important components of industrial 
relations systems globally. This can to a considerable extent be attributed to the fact that it 
serves a wide range of important functions which have resulted in its promotion 
internationally. The first and most important of these is the fact that it serves as a primary rule 
making device in collective labour relations. It affords both employers and workers the 
opportunity to decide upon terms and conditions of employment. This function is valuable as 
it allows workers the opportunity to actively participate in the determination of the rules that 
will govern their employment and this not only ensures greater protection to their interests but 
also affords more stability to the employment relationship as it is given more legitimacy and 
stability through the joined participation of employees and employers.  
 
The reliance on collective bargaining as a means to regulate the employment 
relationship is also in many instances to be preferred over some of the other alternatives 
available. For example, collective bargaining is normally preferred over having employment 
terms unilaterally imposed, because unilateral implementation can result in the interest of 
workers being disregarded. It is also to be preferred over individual workers bargaining with 
employers as in this situation the power balance is distorted which can result in unfair or 
detrimental terms and conditions of employment being imposed. Lastly, it is also a preferable 
means of regulation than the imposition of legislation as legislation can be rigid and less 
capable of taking into account current business and economic trends. 
 
Collective bargaining further serves as a means to regulate the conflict that occurs 
naturally in the industrial arena by providing rules designed to regulate and diffuse conflict 
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situations. This is important as ‘there must be rules designed to promote negotiation, to 
promote agreement, and to promote its observance, and there must be rules designed to 
regulate the use of such social pressure as must be available to both sides as weapons in the 
conflict.’1 Collective bargaining does this by bringing the bargaining parties together in order 
to enable them to discuss their issues openly and resolve their dispute amicably and rationally 
through the establishment and reliance on certain procedures designed to aid dispute 
resolution. It is also utilised to provide parties with forums in which to voice their opinions 
and concerns and in certain circumstances introduces the presence of neutral third parties or 
arbitrators who are tasked with helping the parties break dead-locks in order to move closer to 
reaching a compromise. 
 
Another important function of collective bargaining is to promote democracy in the 
workplace by allowing workers to participate in the decision-making processes.  This helps 
create stability as it helps to obtain ‘the consent of those who have to live under the terms of 
the agreement which emerges from the bargaining process.’2 This function is valuable for a 
healthy employment relationship as it ‘helps to substitute freely given consent for grudging or 
blind obedience.’3 
 
The last function of collective bargaining that will be listed for the purposes of this 
paper is that of social protection. Collective bargaining functions as a tool through which 
workers can improve their social conditions and standard of living as in capitalist economies 
bargaining collectively is probably the ‘most potent anti-poverty program available.’4    
 
2.2 The Inherent Features of Collective Bargaining 
The functions and inherent features of collective bargaining have ensured the position of the 
                                                          
1
   Davies & Freedland Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law at 28. 
2
   Windmuller Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies: A Reappraisal 9. 
3
   Ibid. 
4
   The Silent War: The Assault on Workers’ Freedom to Choose a Union and Bargain Collectively in the United 
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process as ‘a key element of nearly all industrial relations systems of industrialised market 
economies, albeit with different styles, patterns and traditions in different contexts.’5 Two 
features are principally responsible for the variations of the bargaining process and hence the 
different models, namely the features of adaptability and flexibility, which have allowed 
countries, or different industries within countries, the option to customise the bargaining 
process to their own individual and unique needs. This is illustrated by the following 
statement: 
Not only does collective bargaining allow for substantial inter-country 
variations, which indicate that it can adapt to a broad range of economic 
and political systems, but within a given national context it has shown 
itself able to adjust to the exacting requirements of many different 
industrial and occupational sectors, to the private as well as the public 
sector, to the single-plant units as well as to an entire industry, and to the 
skill of manual operatives or service employees as well as to the 
expectations  of the most highly skilled professionals.6  
 
These features have been instrumental in expanding the popularity of collective 
bargaining as it has allowed specific and unique needs of different states to be taken 
into account when adopting collective bargaining as a means of regulating the 
employment relationship through the adoption of different models. Models can vary 
on a number of different bargaining aspects depending on the needs of a particular 
country and can be seen as moving from the completely voluntary side of the 
collective bargaining spectrum right across to the completely compulsory side. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
States -  Issue Brief AFL-CIO September 2005 at 14.<http://www.americanrightsatwork.org 
5
     Bamber & Sheldon ‘Collective Bargaining: Toward Decentralization’ in Blanpain & Engel Comparative 
Labour Law & Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies 513. 
6
     Windmuller (note 2) at 8. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DIFFERENT MODELS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores four different bargaining models. As already mentioned, various types 
of bargaining systems have emerged over the years as countries have been able to adapt the 
bargaining process to best address their economic, political and social needs. These needs 
may range from requiring a system relying on state intervention in the regulation of the 
bargaining process to providing the bargaining parties with varying degrees of autonomy to 
regulate the bargaining process. A state can therefore assess its bargaining needs and 
implement a bargaining model best suited to address those needs as is indicated by the 
following statement: 
Every democratic country faces this challenge of fashioning a system to 
minimize the undesirable aspects of unionism and to maximize unionism’s 
potential as a constructive element in society. The designs of any system 
involves drawing the line between those issues regulated by law and those 
issues regulated by the market. Then, within the class of those issues 
regulated by law, it has to be determined whether the role of the law is to 
‘hold the ring’ in which bargaining takes place or to specify closely the 
terms of the employment relationship and the mechanism of bargaining.7 
 
Bargaining systems are usually categorised as being either compulsory or voluntary.  
However, this categorisation is too simple, because not only are there different degrees of 
voluntariness, but there are also different mechanisms available to regulate and facilitate 
bargaining. These possibilities make it possible to differentiate further between a number of 
voluntary approaches. This paper will look specifically at the compulsory model and three 
different voluntary approaches, which will be classified as follows: First, the purely voluntary 
model. Second, the voluntary model with machinery to promote collective bargaining. Third, 
the voluntary model with compulsory conciliation.  
                                                          
7
     Pencavel ‘The Appropriate Design of Collective Bargaining Systems: Learning From the 
Experience of Britain, Australian and New Zealand’ Comparative Labour Law and Policy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
 
 
3.2 The Purely Voluntary Model 
This model incorporates all those collective bargaining regimes that have emerged though the 
efforts made by the bargaining parties themselves.  It is referred to by this paper as the purely 
voluntary model as this is how the process of collective bargaining originally originated.  It 
also remains the most voluntary bargaining model available to states as it operates free from 
state interference in the bargaining process. The following statement explains this approach: 
The labour union movement, the collective bargaining arrangements, and the 
internal management of unions have developed with little statutory 
regulation. There is no law obliging private employers to bargain with unions, 
not anything that makes collective bargaining agreements enforceable in a 
court. There is no statement in law giving workers the right to strike…. The 
general position taken by the law on these issues is that they are best 
determined by the parties concerned, and that there is little need for regulation 
by the state.8 
 
 
This does not mean that a state adhering to this model incurs no obligations or 
responsibilities in relation to the institution of collective bargaining. The state is under a duty 
to actively promote bargaining and to provide sufficient space within which it can occur. This 
is done by providing for a legislative framework which conducive to collective bargaining 
and supports its utilisation. Essential to this framework is the protection and guarantee of the 
right to freedom of association which provides the basic requirements needed for collective 
bargaining and the promotion thereof in a purely voluntary system by protecting the right to 
form and join trade unions, by protecting unions from unlawful interference from the state as 
well as employers and other non-state parties and by protecting lawful associational activities. 
These are crucial elements that must be guaranteed and protected as without them collective 
bargaining would not be possible. Without them employers and the state would be able to rely 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Journal 1998-1999 (20) 447 at 470. 
8
     Pencavel  (note 7) at 461. 
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on the law of contract and tort to dismiss workers or institute legal proceedings against them 
for participating in union activities and union members would not be able to build up 
sufficient numbers to constitute worthy bargaining opponents. 
 
The most essential elements of this model are the right to freedom of association 
together with the right to strike.  They are responsible for its effective operation and ensure 
that the parties are able to form and join unions for collective bargaining purposes and that 
they are able to embark on legal and protected industrial action without having to fear 
unlawful interference or victimisation. The protection of these two rights ensure the proper 
functioning of systems implementing this purely voluntary model. However, it is submitted 
by this paper that these elements are the driving force behind all the different bargaining 
models, whether they are compulsory or voluntary, and despite any mechanisms or 
procedures designed to regulate and facilitate bargaining.  
 
3.3 The Voluntary Model Requiring Machinery to Promote Collective Bargaining 
This model as with the original voluntary model, also relies on the protection of the right to 
freedom of association and the right to strike as essential elements required for the success of 
the establishment of bargaining relationships. However, unlike the previous model systems 
following this approach provide by means of national legislation machinery aimed at 
supporting and promoting collective bargaining. This is done by either establishing  
permanent, ad hoc or specialised bodies ‘whose purpose is to help promote collective 
bargaining by studying general problems, drawing up codes of good conduct and giving 
advice to the parties to help them solve particular problems they may encounter.’9 The 
machinery is designed to facilitate negotiation and also at resolving any disputes that may 
occur. 
 
                                                          
9
    1994 Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III (4B) at para 245. 
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Different types of machinery have been implemented by countries as the ‘development 
of machinery for collective bargaining and the characteristics of that machinery are the 
outcome of the particular needs and circumstances existing at country, industry and enterprise 
levels….’10 These include the establishment of joint bodies, forums, committees and councils 
which are responsible for providing a platform on which the parties can voice their opinions 
and bargain according to pre-established rules of conduct and procedures or in other cases in 
accordance with procedures which are to be determined by the parties, but which always 
leaves the outcome of the process up to the parties involved. 
 
3.4 The Voluntary Model with Compulsory Conciliation 
This model is also classified as voluntary as the state does not regulate or intervene in the 
bargaining process and  the parties are permitted to establish bargaining relationships on their 
own accord. It protects the right to freedom of association and the right to strike and to this 
extent is the same as the previous two model. However, there is a substantial difference 
between this model and the previous two as it imposes compulsory conciliation as a pre-
condition to a protected strike in circumstances where negotiations have failed.  
 
Compulsory conciliation is a mechanism relied upon to minimise the need for industrial 
action. It compels the parties to the negotiating table after an impasse has been reached in an 
attempt to resolve the dispute through communication and in the presence of a neutral third. 
To this extent this model imposes a requirement which is very similar to a duty to bargain as 
found in the compulsory models, which is discussed below. However, unlike a duty to 
bargain, which compels a bargaining relationship as soon as a union has met the necessary 
threshold requirements,  the bargaining parties in this model are only compelled to negotiate 
once they have established a bargaining relationship themselves and provided an impasse has 
been reached. Conciliation is also focused on the process of finding a compromise or on 
breaking a dead-lock whereas the a duty to bargaining is focused on the respective rights of 
                                                          
10
     Windmuller (note 2) at 52. 
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the parties. 
3.5 The Compulsory Model 
The compulsory model adheres to a completely different set of principles than those followed 
by the voluntary models. Where the supporters of the voluntary models view state 
interference in the bargaining arena as undesired, the supporters of the compulsory model 
view it as beneficial, desirable and as a means of promoting the bargaining process. 
Therefore, this model compels the establishment of bargaining relationships through 
legislation by imposing a duty to bargain which is judicially enforced. Its characteristic 
feature is a high degree of state involvement in the regulation of the bargaining process. Both 
the legislature and judiciary are more actively involved in the bargaining arena than what is 
found under voluntary regimes. They regulate issues concerning the recognition of trade 
unions who allege sufficient representation,  the establishment of a bargaining relationships, 
the appropriate unit for bargaining, the level at which bargaining occurs and many other 
aspects of bargaining collectively. 
 
3.6 The Essential Elements Required By All Models of Collective Bargaining 
Is important to note that despite the classification of different bargaining models, all the 
models essentially rely on three common features which are fundamental to any bargaining 
model. These three features constitute the core of the bargaining process as without them the 
collective bargaining process would not be possible.  
 
The first essential element consists of the right to freedom of association together with 
its ancillary rights including the right to organise. This right can be seen as constituting the 
first step in the bargaining process. It creates the space in which bargaining is to occur by 
ensuring that employees and their unions have the means to organise and recruit members, by 
protecting certain associational activities which are required for the bargaining process and by 
protecting union members from being dismissed for participation in union activities or being 
victimised. 
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The second essential element consists of ‘the freedom to bargain collectively’ which can 
be described as ‘the negative right to collective bargaining.’11 This freedom means that the 
state may not interfere with bargaining by way of laws, but it is a right which may also be 
enforced against other parties as ‘it is a right that may be enforceable against employers’ 
organisations and trade unions that, by collective agreement or by the exercise of economic 
power, prevent employers or and workers from engaging in collective bargaining.’12 
 
The third essential feature relates the use of economic weapons in bargaining process. 
The use of economic power and the ability to bargain effectively have gone hand in hand 
since the advent of the bargaining process.  Without the threat of economic reprisal there 
would be nothing to induce the bargaining parties to compromise with each another in order 
to conclude an agreement. Therefore, this element is crucial to any bargaining system in the 
private sector of labour relations13 and its importance, at leas to some extent, is recognised by 
all collective bargaining models. This element can be seen as one of the final steps in the 
bargaining process, as it is only relied on where negotiations and other means of obtaining 
agreements have failed.  
 
It can therefore be seen that all bargaining models are very similar in respect of the three 
abovementioned essential elements. Different systems may give effect to these elements in 
lesser or greater extents, but they must be given effect to if the bargaining model is to function 
as they form the core of the bargaining process. 
 
However, the models obviously have distinguishing features that make it possible to 
speak of different collective bargaining models. These distinguishing features are to be found 
                                                          
11
    Cheadle, Davis and Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 388. 
12
    Ibid. 
13
    The right to resort to industrial action, though being an essential component in bargaining models occurring 
within the private sector, is not an essential element of models found in the public sector dealing with essential 
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somewhere in between the second essential element and the third as it is the provision of 
different mechanisms aimed at facilitating, promoting and regulating bargaining that gives 
each individual model its characteristic features. They are aimed at compelling bargaining 
relationships to ensue or at making it easier for parties to meet at the bargaining table if they 
so choose by providing them with a forum in which they can discuss their issues. All these 
additional features are aimed at avoiding unnecessary unrest where this is possible. However, 
where the mechanisms and procedures fail to do this the ultimate way of settling disputes is 
still dependent on the ability of the parties to flex their industrial muscle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
services, as here industrial action could be hazardous to the lives and well being of people. 
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CHAPTER 4: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE ILO 
 
Before the different models and their promotion of the bargaining process can be considered 
in greater detail it is imperative to understand the collective bargaining standards developed 
by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the implications of this on its Member 
States. It is also important to point out that the Organisation’s perspective on collective 
bargaining is particularly important for the purposes of this paper, as each of the countries 
forming part of this comparative analysis are members of the ILO and they are therefore 
obliged to comply with ILO standards. These obligations will be set out below and will also 
be discussed in more details when considering the bargaining systems adhered to by each of 
the individual countries.  
 
The ILO has recognised the importance of collective bargaining for many years and ‘one of 
its chief tasks has been to advance collective bargaining throughout the world.’14 It has set out 
a specific framework within which it believes collective bargaining should occur in order for 
the process to be successful and Member States are under a duty to comply with the basics of 
this framework. This duty arises for Member States in one of two ways. The first relates to the 
ratification of  ILO Conventions concerning collective bargaining. Conventions  create 
international obligations and establish international labour standards. As soon as a state 
ratifies a Convention, which is done by signing it, the state is under a duty to comply with the 
requirements as set out in that Convention. In terms of collective bargaining, the two most 
important Conventions are the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1948 (No. 98).  
 
                                                          
14
     Gernigon, Odero & Guido ‘ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining’ International Labour 
Review (2000) vol 139(1) 33 at 34. 
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The second way in which a Member State incurs a duty to promote collective bargaining in 
accordance with ILO principles, arises from the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work.15 It was adopted in 1998 and its  importance lies in the fact that it 
imposes obligations on Member States, to observe the principles enshrined in the fundamental 
ILO Conventions, irrespective of whether or not they have ratified those fundamental 
Conventions. It provides that ‘all Members, have an obligation, arising from the very fact of 
membership in the Organisation, to respect, to promote and realise, in good faith and in 
accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights….’16 It is 
also important as the it gives effect to the 1919 ILO Constitution as well as to principles 
contained in1944 Declaration of Philadelphia. The Declaration ‘codifies the ILO’s long 
understanding of the fundamental human rights contained in its Constitution and standards, as 
comprising freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively; freedom from forced 
labour; freedom from child labour; and freedom from discrimination’.17 As can be seen, both 
the right to freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively, as provided for by 
Conventions No. 87 and No. 98, are such fundamental human rights and are therefore 
provided for by the Declaration. This means that the universal reach of the Declaration, has 
important consequences for the bargaining regimes of all ILO Member States, as they are 
under an obligation to ‘respect, to promote and realise, in good faith’ the fundamental rights 
concerning ‘freedom of association’ and the ‘right to collective bargaining’ even thought they 
might not have ratified Convention No. 98 or 87. 
 
4.1 The Collective Bargaining Framework of the ILO 
As mentioned, the ILO sets out a specific framework within which it believes collective 
bargaining should occur if it is to be successful. This framework can be described as follows: 
This framework within which collective bargaining must take place if it is to 
be viable and effective is based on the principle of the independence and 
                                                          
15
     ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 86th Session, Geneva, June 1998. 
16
     Section 2 (note 15). 
17
     Swepston ‘International Labour Law’ in Blanpain Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in 
Industrialized Market Economies at 45. 
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autonomy of the parties and the free and voluntary nature of the 
negotiations; it requires the minimum possible level of interference by the 
public authorities in bipartite negotiations and gives primacy to employers 
and their organisations and workers’ as the parties to the bargaining.18 
 
There are three important elements that make up this framework. The first element comprises 
of the right to freedom of association and is provided for and protected by Convention No. 87. 
This Convention provides workers and employers with the right to establish and ‘join 
organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation.19 It provides these 
organisations with the right to ‘draw up their own constitutions and rules, to elect their 
representatives in full freedom…’ and prevents public authorities from restricting or impeding 
this right or its lawful exercise.20 It also obliges ‘workers and employers and their respective 
organisations’ to respect the law of the land while at the same time requiring the law of the 
land not to impair, nor be applied so as to impair the guarantees provided for by the 
Convention.’21 In dealing with the protection of the right to organise, the Convention requires 
that all ‘necessary and appropriate’ measures be taken to ensure the right to organise is 
exercised freely.22 The right to freedom of association in terms of the ILO has a wide meaning 
and encompasses the right to organise and the right to bargain collectively as well. It 
constitutes a crucial element of the collective bargaining framework, without which collective 
bargaining could not exist properly. 
 
The second element of the ILO’s framework requires states to implement machinery to 
promote voluntary collective bargaining. This is provided for by Article 4 of Convention, No. 
98, which states that ‘[m]easures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where 
necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for 
voluntary negotiation between employer or employers’ organisation and workers’ 
                                                          
18
     Gernigon, Odero & Guido ‘ILO Principles Concerning Collective Bargaining’ International 
Labour Review (2000) vol 139(1) 33 at 34. 
19
       Article 2 The Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively Convention, 1948 (No. 98). 
20
       Article 3 (note 19). 
21
       Article 8 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87)  
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organisation, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means 
of collective agreement.’23 Article 4 clearly indicates the ILO’s preference for a voluntary 
approach to collective bargaining. This however, according to the Digest, does not  mean that 
the compulsory model violates the principles or Conventions as set out by the Organisation, at 
it states that the fact that Article 4 does not ‘entail recourse to measures of compulsion’ does 
‘not mean that governments should abstain from any measure whatsoever aiming to establish 
a collective bargaining mechanism.’24 Measures of compulsion or degrees of voluntariness 
within a collective bargaining system are therefore left up to the state’s discretion, provided 
the parties are ultimately left free to conclude their own collective agreements and the terms 
thereof.    
  
The third and final element involves the right to strike. This right according to the 
Digest is ‘one of the essential means through which workers and their organizations may 
promote and defend their economic and social interests’ and an ‘intrinsic corollary to the right 
to organise protected by Convention No. 87.’25 It is a necessary part of the institution of 
collective bargaining and should therefore be given effect to by ILO Member States. 
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CHAPTER 5:  THE DUTY TO BARGAIN 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Before the bargaining regimes of the five different countries are discussed it is important to 
explore the most noticeable feature of the compulsory model of collective bargaining in 
greater detail. This feature is the duty to bargain and it is this model’s primary means of 
regulating and promoting the bargaining process. It is very important to understand the 
origins and purpose of this model as it was designed with specifics goals in mind. It first 
appeared in the labour legislation of the United States of America and relies heavily on 
legislative procedures and regulations to promote and regulate bargaining. Unlike the 
voluntary models, bargaining relationships are automatically imposed by statute once all 
necessary legislative requirements have been met making it unnecessary to rely on 
bargaining strength for the establishment of bargaining relationships.  
 
This chapter looks at how the duty operates, how effective it is as a method of 
inducing meaningful negotiations and how successful it is at reducing industrial unrest in the 
collective bargaining arena. However, in order to evaluate the success or failure of the ‘duty 
to bargain’ approach effectively, it becomes necessary to compare the compulsory model 
with the voluntary models of bargaining. in order to establish whether a particular approach 
can be said to be superior at promoting collective bargaining.  
 
5.2 What the Duty Entails 
The ‘duty to bargain’ entails the imposition of a legal duty on an employer to bargain in 
good faith, with a trade union recognised as the bargaining agent, over bargaining subjects, 
for the appropriate bargaining unit. The obligation to negotiate arises once a union has 
attained the majority of support from the workers in a bargaining unit.  Where a recalcitrant 
employer refuses to bargain, the remedy available to the union is a judicial one, constituted 
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by an order compelling the employer to bargain with the union.  
 
One of the most striking implications of imposing a statutorily imposed duty to 
bargain is to involve the state more vigorously in the bargaining process.  The state ensures 
the establishment of bargaining relationships by placing a legal duty on employers to 
recognise and bargain in good faith with unions who have attained bargaining status by 
meeting the necessary legislative requirements. The scope for permissible state intervention 
is limited to the establishment of relationships and the regulation of the bargaining process 
itself. It does not extend to the content and conclusion of collective agreements, as these are 
matters to be determined by the bargaining parties themselves.  
 
The state’s regulation is there to assist the parties to reach an agreement and to 
facilitate the process.  However, if the parties are still unable to conclude a collective 
agreement after exhausting the statutory requirements, they may have to rely industrial 
action in an attempt to have their demands met. In this regard the compulsory model 
imposing a legally enforced duty to bargain is no different to the voluntary models. Both 
approaches rely on industrial action as the ultimate arbiter of bargaining disputes, as it is 
always relied in where other dispute preventing or dispute resolving mechanisms have 
failed. 
 
The duty to bargain also has further important implications, as it involves more than 
simply compelling  parties to the bargaining table. It signifies ‘a policy regime that involves 
fundamental choices as to the form and level of collective bargaining and the nature of its 
regulation’ and ‘commits society to a collective-bargaining regime centered on the 
workplace rather than on the industry.’26 It requires the state or its designated administrative 
agency to regulate the following fundamental bargaining aspects: First, they have to 
determine who the bargaining parties are and what threshold requirements must be met in 
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order for unions to obtain bargaining rights. Second, they are responsible for establishing the 
appropriate bargaining unit. Third, they regulate the subjects that may be bargained over. 
Fourthly, they are responsible for regulating the way in which bargaining is conducted by 
enforcing a duty to bargain in good faith. These issues are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
5.2.1 Determination of the Bargaining Parties 
The ‘duty to bargain’ arises once a trade union has acquired bargaining status. Therefore, the 
attainment of bargaining status is a crucial requirement that must be complied with before 
any bargaining can ensue. A union usually becomes entitled to recognition once it has 
reached the required level of representativeness, which means that it has sufficient level of 
support from the employees at the workplace or bargaining unit. 
 
Recognition or bargaining status can be granted in various ways. It essentially depends 
on the law of a particular country. Provision is usually made for voluntary as well as 
mandatory recognition. Voluntary recognition involves an employer acknowledging a union 
who has met the bargaining threshold, without being compelled to do so. However, because 
employers are often reluctant to do so, provision is also made for mandatory recognition 
procedures. Mandatory recognition involves a statutory procedure which results in the 
certification of the union as a bargaining agent. It requires compliance with certain 
formalities, for example and election, and is therefore a more onerous process. 
 
5.2.2 Bargaining Unit Determination 
The bargaining unit is ‘that part of a workforce or workplace in which a union claims 
recognition and from which the members on whose behalf it negotiates are drawn.’27 Its 
definition provides the boundaries separating those employees who are represented by the 
union and those that are not. These boundaries may be defined according to various factors 
such as trade, occupation, geographical proximity, industry or skill. The determination of 
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this unit is an important part the compulsory model of bargaining as ‘issues of representivity 
can be resolved only by reference to a bargaining unit.’28 In most countries following the 
compulsory approach this determination is left up to the state and its specially appointed 
administrative agencies, who decide on these issues by referring to specific criteria that has 
been established to aid this determination. 
 
5.2.3 Bargaining Subject Matter 
The subject-matter that may be bargained over is also a matter capable of regulation by the 
state in the compulsory model of collective bargaining. Therefore, the range of permissible 
bargaining topics may differ from country to country as it is ‘influenced by various forces 
including the relative power of the parties, custom and practice, basic agreements and law.’29 
In the voluntary models of collective bargaining, it is mostly the bargaining parties 
themselves who decide on the range of negotiable issues and whether they wish to exclude 
certain topics from the bargaining table. In the compulsory model, the curtailment of 
permissible bargaining subjects are regulated by the state through the passing legislation. 
This affords the state the opportunity to play a greater role in the regulation and control of 
the bargaining process, if it so chooses. 
 
5.2.4 Bargaining Conduct 
The compulsory model of collective bargaining normally regulates bargaining conduct by 
imposing a duty to bargain in good faith. It also does so by prohibiting conduct amounting to 
unfair labour practices, which is a specific type of action taken by either a union or employer 
which countering effective collective bargaining.  
 
In relation to the duty to bargain, the subjective standard of good faith requires the 
parties to ‘approach the bargaining table with a sincere desire to reach agreement on the 
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issues in dispute and to make a reasonable effort towards that end.’30 It strives towards 
creating ideal bargaining conditions by prescribing to the parties how they should conduct 
themselves and what their attitude should be towards the bargaining process. It prohibits 
certain objective conduct which is considered to evidence bad faith. It also regulates 
bargaining conduct to the extent that it requires the disclosure of certain information and 
prohibits employers from bargaining with individual employees.  
 
5.3 The Purpose of Imposing a Duty to Bargain 
As mention earlier, the compulsory model of bargaining originated in the United States and 
was specifically developed and implemented by the government of the time, as it provided 
the means by which the state could regulate and facilitate the bargaining process, in a very 
particular manner and to a much greater extent than would have been possible by following 
a voluntary approach. Therefore, the purposes of imposing a duty to bargain must be 
discussed with reference to the American context in which it was developed. 
 
The development of bargaining collectively in the United States did not follow the 
same path as it did in most other countries. In other industrialized market economies, the 
process of collective bargaining developed voluntarily and through the efforts made by trade 
unions, with little, if any assistance being provided by law. Where the law did offer 
assistance, it was usually in the form of legalising unions, permitting union activities and 
allowing union members and employers to resort to industrial action. However, the 
American approach departed significantly from this, as the process of bargaining was 
specifically adopted by the state as a national policy.  
 
The Unites States enacted the National Labour Relations Act (NLRA)31 in 1935. 
Section 1 of the Act makes it clear that the principal reason for adopting this policy was to 
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protect trade. Every paragraph under this section makes reference to either the protection of 
commerce, the promotion of commerce or eliminating causes which affects the free flow of 
commerce. The main threat posed to trade was the high incidence of industrial action, which 
made Congress decide to impose a collective bargaining regime which would enable the 
state to intervene in the bargaining process in order to ensure that its principal objective of 
protecting commerce was achieved.  
 
Workers also benefited under this new policy even though their interests were only an 
indirect concern to Congress as it was found that ‘inequality of bargaining 
power…substantially burdens and effects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate 
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage 
earners….’32 Therefore, their interest had to be protected in so far as it would provide the 
labour force with greater purchasing power. The regulation and endorsement of collective 
bargaining could therefore be utilized to ‘eliminate certain sources of industrial  unrest, to 
remedy the inequality of bargaining power between employers and individual employees, to 
increase mass purchasing power through increased wage levels, and to eliminate competitive 
advantages based on differentials in wage rates and working conditions within and between 
industries.’33 
 
To attain this, Section 8(5) was inserted into the NLRA. This section placed the 
employer under a duty to recognise a union as a bargaining agent once it has attained 
majority status and made it an unfair labour practice for an employer to ‘refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees….’ This rather simple provision was 
intended to serve several useful purposes according to Professor Cox, who said that by 
‘reading the testimony, the debate, and the history of the times with a large measure of 
hindsight’ it is possible for one to discern four purposes which section 8(5) hoped to 
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achieve.34 The first purpose it would serve would be to decrease the number of strikes 
occurring for union recognition, by legally requiring an employer to recognise a union who 
has attained majority status. This would mean that a union with majority support would no 
longer have to strike in order to force an employer to recognise it as a bargaining partner as 
the employer would be legally obliged to afford the union its due recognition. Secondly, it 
would create a more equal balance of power between the parties through mandatory 
recognition, as this would prevent certain anti-union tactics designed to weaken the union, 
such as ‘the devastating psychological blow to have the employer shut the office door in the 
union’s face.’35 Thirdly, it would ensure that that the basic policy of the NLRA was given 
effect to by promoting collective bargaining as opposed to individual bargaining. Finally, it 
would involve a ‘rational process of persuasion’ which ‘enables employers and employees to 
dig behind their prejudices and exchange their views with the result that agreement is 
reached on many points while on others it is discovered that the area of disagreement is so 
narrow that compromise is cheaper than battle.’36   
 
Originally when the NLRA was enacted,  no reference was made to good faith. This 
was because it intended for the duty to bargain to inquire into what happens between the 
employer and the union behind closed doors. It was simply intended as an obligation on an 
employer to recognises the duly appointed union and to bargain with it.  However, this 
stance was soon believed to be inadequate as many employers resorted to surface 
bargaining. They went through the motions of bargaining by listening to the representations 
made by the union and then merely rejecting them. This mindset did not help the parties 
reach agreement and it also did not decrease the numbers strikes taking place. As a result, it 
assumed that it ‘was not enough for the law to compel the parties to meet and treat without 
passing judgment upon the quality of the negotiations. The bargaining status of a union can 
be destroyed by going through the motions of negotiation almost as easily as by bluntly 
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withholding recognition.’37  
 
 
To solve this problem Congress had to intrude further into the bargaining arena. This 
was done by amending the NLRA in 1947, by enacting the Taft-Hartley Act. Section 8(5) 
became section 8(a)(5), and section 8(d) was inserted which defined the meaning and extent 
of the ‘duty to bargain’ to include the requirement of ‘good faith.‘ Section 8(d) also required 
the parties ‘to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith’ and made it expressly clear 
that ‘such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession….’ The purpose of this section was to promote meaningful 
negotiation and to prevent surface bargaining. It was aimed at bringing ‘to the bargaining 
table parties willing to present their proposals and articulate supporting reasons, to listen to 
and weigh the proposals and reasons of the other party, and to search for some common 
ground which can serve as the basis for a written bilateral agreement.’38 This was required in 
an attempt to minimise strikes as it was believed that fruitful negotiations would enable the 
parties to resolve their differences amicably thereby reducing the need for industrial action. 
Economic power would still ultimately play a principal role in determining bargaining 
disputes, but it would only be relied on as a last resort as it assumed that the imposition of a 
duty to bargain in good faith would ensure that these instances were kept to a minimum by 
fostering friendly, rational and informed discussions and prohibiting conduct which would 
undermine a bargaining relationship. The following statement illustrates this position 
clearly: 
Collective bargaining is not merely an economic exercise, being just as much an 
exercise in human relations. This latter aspect of collective bargaining cannot be 
carried on successfully if the parties are left free to resort to tactics inherently 
destructive of the bargaining relationship. The presence of a duty to bargain in good 
faith serves to control such tactics while still leaving the parties free to resort to 
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legitimate economic sanctions.39 
 
The requirement of good faith meant that the parties had to ‘approach the bargaining table 
with a sincere desire to reach agreement on the issues in dispute and to make a reasonable 
effort toward that end.’40 It works towards creating ideal bargaining conditions by 
prescribing to the parties how they should conduct themselves and what their attitude should 
be towards the bargaining process. It requires an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an 
agreement with the other, which makes a party’s state of mind important and in need of 
determination, through relying on a subjective test. However, the requirement of good faith, 
despite its aim of promoting industrial peace and facilitating bargaining, brought with it a 
range of new difficulties.  
 
5.4 Difficulties Incurred by Imposing Good Faith 
The imposition of a ‘duty to bargain in good faith’ causes many difficulties in practice. It 
requires a party to approach to bargaining table with a particular type of attitude which 
conforms to the generally accepted good faith standard.  It requires a genuine desire to reach 
settlement and a willingness to listen to the other side with an open mind.  
 
Essentially, good faith presents three challenging problems in practice which have to 
be dealt with by systems relying on this model of collective bargaining. The first problem 
relates to the way in which compliance with the good faith requirement is determined. The 
second deals with the delicate distinction that must be made between ‘tough bargaining’ and 
‘bad faith bargaining’. The third problem relates to what constitutes an appropriate remedy 
for the breach of a duty to bargain in good faith. These problems will be briefly examined by 
this section. A more detailed analysis of how each country approaches these difficulties will 
be made when dealing with the bargaining regimes in place in each of the individual 
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countries forming part of the comparative analysis. 
 
5.4.1 Determining ‘Good Faith’ 
This psychological standard is ‘extremely difficult to understand, articulate, or implement.’41 
Ascertaining whether or not there has been compliance is difficult as this standard is ‘seldom 
capable of patent demonstration.’42 This difficulty leads to the risk of a party pretending to 
bargain in good faith as a skilled negotiator can simply mask their actual bad faith intention, 
by going through the motions of bargaining without having any real desire to reach an 
agreement with the other side. 
 
5.4.2 Tough Bargaining and Bad Faith Bargaining 
Another interesting problem that arises where a duty to bargain in good faith is imposed 
involves making a distinction between ‘tough bargaining’ and ‘bad faith bargaining’ as the 
duty to bargain in good faith specifically allows a party to be adamant regarding their 
bargaining position. However, in some cases a refusal to make concession or put forward 
proposal can be an indication that a party lacks good faith. Drawing the dividing line 
between permissible hard bargaining and being guilty of bargaining in bad faith can 
therefore be very difficult, if not impossible, to do accurately. 
 
5.4.3 Remedies 
Providing an appropriate remedy for the breach of the duty to bargain in good faith is 
another difficulty that arises. The compulsory models do not permit the state to determine 
the outcomes of collective bargaining. Therefore, it is not appropriate for a remedy to come 
to the aid of the innocent party by deciding the issues in their favour. Remedies must allow 
the parties the opportunity to determine the outcome themselves while at the same time also 
trying to put to an end bad faith bargaining. 
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CHAPTER 6:  COUNTRIES ADHERING TO THE COMPULSORY MODEL OF 
 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the collective bargaining regimes of the United States of America and 
Canada, which adhere to the compulsory model of collective bargaining. These states have 
implemented this particular model as it is perceived to offer certain specific advantages. 
These advantages include the fact that it offers the government more power to regulate and 
control the bargaining process as well as the fact that it compels the bargaining parties to the 
negotiating table as soon as certain mandatory requirements have been met, which helps to 
ensures that negotiation and the possible conclusion of collective agreements occur much 
sooner than would be possible in systems where unions have to first go on strike for 
bargaining status and the establishment of bargaining relationships. This also reduces the 
need for strike activity. However, it must be kept in mind that what is advantageous to the 
state may not always be advantageous to the bargaining parties. For instance, the fact that 
this model allows a much higher degree of state intervention can be disadvantageous to the 
bargaining parties, as it removes their power to decide on aspects of the bargaining 
relationships which in voluntary systems are normally left up to their autonomy. It can also 
have the effect of making the process more rigid as compliance with legislation and 
formalities become essential. 
 
Therefore, this chapter looks at some of the potential advantages and disadvantages of 
the compulsory model by examining the bargaining systems of the above two countries. The 
approach will be to firstly, examine the historical development of the bargaining process as 
understanding the historical events that led up the implementation of the compulsory model 
is crucial to understanding current attitudes towards the process. It also provides insight into 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
42
     Globe Cotton Mills v NLRB 103 F.2d 91, 94. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34
the level of success the process has attained in each country, or alternatively, the reasons 
why the process has failed to achieve its objectives. The historical element is especially 
important with regards to the compulsory models as it is imposed by the state because of 
prevailing circumstances. Therefore, it is important to take note of the political, social and 
economic circumstances that were present at the time when the models were first 
implemented. The historical development will be followed by looking at the operation and 
effectiveness of the current framework and particular difficulties that arise in relation to the 
current framework. Finally, where the bargaining system of these countries do not comply 
with their obligations in terms of the ILO it will be pointed out and briefly discussed. 
 
Another issue that will be addressed is whether or not the potential advantages offered 
by the compulsory approach can only be attained through imposing a duty to bargain or 
whether there are other less invasive means in which the same objectives can be achieved. 
As will be pointed out, there are other less invasive means of attaining these objectives, for 
example such the process of conciliation, which is required by some voluntary models and 
essentially serves a very similar function to that of a duty to bargain. 
 
6.2 The United States of America 
 
6.2.1 The Historical Development of the Duty to Bargain 
Labour relations in America have since the start been characterised by severe hostility 
towards the process of collective bargaining. Employers have ‘from the beginning of the 
labour movement in the nineteenth century, used every means available to prevent unions 
from organizing, to defeat their efforts, and to destroy them were they became established.’43 
As a result of this adversarial attitude, collective bargaining initially played a very minor 
role in industrial relations. However, this situation became unsustainable during the Great 
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Depression in the 1930’s, when the country was experiencing a severe economic crisis. 
Congress realised that something had to be done to alleviate the problems caused by the 
economic depression that the state was faced with. It implemented federal legislation which 
adopted the process of collective bargaining as a national policy. The National Labour 
Relations Act of 193544 provided workers with many rights including the right to self-
organisation, the right to form and join trade unions, the right to bargain collectively and the 
right to participate in ‘other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.’45 It also outlawed certain behaviour, which had the effect of 
damaging the bargaining relationship, by prohibiting such behaviour as unfair labour 
practices.  
 
Under the new system unions were able to flourish and many social and economic 
victories were won for workers. However, this prosperous time for collective labour 
relations was short-lived as during the 1940’s and 1950’s a perception started to develop that 
under the dispensation of the Act,  unions were becoming too strong. This perception could 
largely be attributed to the significant increase in strike activity. As a result the NLRA was 
amended. The first amended took place in 1947 by the passing of the Taft-Hartley Act. The 
second occurred in 1959 by enacting the Landrum-Griffin Act. These amendments were 
mostly aimed at curbing union power. It had the effect of ensuring that union strength and 
the prominence of collective bargaining, as a method of determining terms and conditions on 
employment in the United States, began a long and steady decline that still continues today. 
 
6.2.2 Current Framework in Support of Collective Bargaining 
The law regulating collective bargaining in the United States of America has not changed 
much over the years since the implementation of the NLRA and its amendments. This Act 
remains the core piece of federal legislation responsible for the facilitation and supervision 
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of collective labour relations. Bargaining still occurs at plant level, between the employer 
and trade union elected by the majority of employees. The trade union acquires the exclusive 
right to bargain on behalf of its members and non-members in the appropriate bargaining 
unit after it has satisfied the necessary procedural requirements. Once all the requirements 
are met, a duty to bargain in good faith is imposed on both parties. However, the duty to 
bargain does not take away the necessity of resorting to economic weapons as this is still 
‘expected whenever the power of persuasion, including the threatened consequences of 
resort to economic warfare, fails to adjust the parties’ differences.’46 
 
6.2.3 Effectiveness of the Duty to Bargain in the American System of Collective 
Bargaining  
Within the American system of collective bargaining, the imposition of a duty to bargain has 
not been as effective as was hoped for. This situation is as a result of many different factors 
all of which have caused a serious decline in the union density and success of American 
collective bargaining. In many cases the problems are attributable to the ‘legal and 
administrative policies concerning the enforcement of unfair labour practices or the 
certification of unions as bargaining agents.’47 In other the problems relate to inadequate 
protection of bargaining rights such as the right to freedom of association, the right to 
organise and even the right to strike, which make it difficult for workers to organise 
successfully, join unions and exercise collective bargaining rights. Another very important 
factor contributing to the weak position of American collective bargaining is the fact that the 
NLRA does not promote collect bargaining adequately as its position towards the process is 
quite neutral. One of the primary concerns of the Act is the regulation of the collective 
bargaining process through laws and procedures without any focus on its promotion as 
required by the ILO. This is evidenced by the certification process which simply allows 
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employers to resist the certification of a union as a bargaining agent.  
6.2.4 Difficulties incurred by imposing a duty to bargain 
The imposition of a judicially enforced duty to bargain gives rise to many difficulties in 
practice. It also has a tendency to complicate the bargaining process as well as the 
relationships between the bargaining parties. These inherent difficulties have been the 
subject of discussion for many years as labour law practitioners and academics debate 
whether or not legislation should even impose this duty and attempt to generate the  
psychological standard of good faith. However, despite these recognised problems, the duty 
to bargain in good faith has remained an important part of the American collective 
bargaining framework for over fifty years. 
 
This section deals with some of the primary difficulties incurred by imposing this 
duty. It will look at the problems incurred when trying to establish whether or not a party has 
complied with the requirement of good faith, drawing distinctions between bad faith 
bargaining and tough bargaining and providing for appropriate remedies where a party has 
been found to be in breach their duty.  
 
6.2.4.1 Establishing Good Faith 
The duty to bargain not only requires the bargaining parties to bargain with each other, but 
also requires them to bargain in good faith. Bargaining in good faith entails approaching the 
negotiating table with a particular subjective intention. However, a subjective state of mind 
is hard to detect accurately and therefore it requires compliance with a standard which is 
‘extremely difficult to understand, articulate, or implement.’48 This inherent difficulty 
provides employers with the opportunity to breach the provisions of the NLRA by 
bargaining in bad faith because the likelihood of them being found out is slim as they can 
mask their actual subjective intentions, which is easy as bad faith can only be inferred from 
external evidence. 
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In the United States, the courts and labour boards can infer bad faith either from the 
expressed declaration of a party or they can it infer it from a party’s conduct. These are 
discussed more fully below. 
 
6.2.4.1.1 Expressed Declaration 
The NLRB and courts can accept a lack of good faith if a party expressly declares that he 
lacks the necessary intention to bargain in good faith. This express statement is taken to 
reveal a person‘s actual state of mind. However, this is a situation that rarely occurs in 
practice and more often than not, the courts or Board will have to infer that a person has not 
complied with the subjective standard of good faith by looking at other external evidence. 
 
6.2.4.1.2 Inferred from Conduct 
Generally bargaining parties will not admit to the fact that they have contravened the law by 
declaring their lack of good faith during the negotiating process. On the contrary, they will 
attempt to conceal bad faith intentions and bargain ‘with a view toward making the strongest 
record for NLRB scrutiny.’49 Therefore, it becomes necessary for the courts and Board to 
establish whether or not a party has in fact bargaining in good faith by looking at the 
available external evidence.  
 
There are three forms of external evidence that can be relied on in order to draw an 
inference of bad faith. The first is provided by a party’s cumulative conduct. The second, by 
relying on a single act and the third, by examining the contents of a party’s bargaining 
proposals. The courts or the Board may look at an employer’s cumulative conduct and 
bargaining tactics to help it determine ‘whether the employer acted like a man with a mind 
closed against agreement with the union.’50 To determine whether the employer acted in this 
manner or not, one must ask another important question which is ‘whether a normal 
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employer, willing to agree with a labour union, would have followed the same course of 
action.’51 The process involves trying to deduce a person’s subjective intention by examining 
the totality of their actions. This determination is extremely difficult to make accurately. It is 
also risky as a party’s cumulative conduct may evidence bad faith while the person is 
actually bargaining in good faith and a person assumed to be bargaining in good faith might 
actually be bargaining in bad faith.  
 
Another possible way to infer a lack of good faith by examining external conduct is 
through  utilising the ‘per se’ doctrine. This doctrine differs from that of determining a lack 
of good faith through the evaluation of cumulative conduct as here a single act committed by 
one of the parties is automatically used to make a finding of bad faith. Acts constituting per 
se violations include the refusal to meet with the other side, refusing to sign a written 
contract which embodies the terms agreed to during the negotiations and refusing to provide 
the union with necessary and requested information. These acts are evidence bad faith 
immediately as they are ‘in the preponderance of cases likely to disrupt or frustrate 
negotiations and not likely to be justified by substantial business reasons.’52 However, the 
per se doctrine, although useful is not completely reliable either, as once again, it is possible 
that employer who has committed a per se violation has a valid justification for their conduct 
and therefore has not lacked a good faith. 
 
The third way in which bad faith can be inferred through external evidence is by 
examining the contents of bargaining proposals. This method is however very problematic 
as the contents of bargaining proposals are matters to be left free from government 
interference and scrutiny. This position is clearly depicted in the NLRA which requires 
government intervention in order to facilitate and regulate bargaining, but makes it clear that 
the duty to bargain only requires the parties to meet and confer without being under any 
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obligation to reach an agreement. This is because the whole idea behind the duty is to get the 
parties to the negotiating table and to regulate the procedures getting them there, but while at 
the same time allowing them the freedom to agree to their own terms without any state 
interference. In order to ensure this, Section 8(d) of the Act, states that a party is under no 
obligation to make proposals or concession. Therefore, the contents of an agreement should 
not be scrutinised by the state, as it is left up to the autonomy of the parties to decide to the 
exclusion of all others.  
 
However, the problem with establishing good faith, requires the contents of bargaining 
proposals to be looked at in certain circumstances. This is necessary where the contents or 
proposals might evidence bad faith and obviously this is problematic as brings the Board and 
Court ‘dangerously close to substantive regulation of the terms of collective agreements.’53 
However, this power to do this is essential as ‘its absence might render collective bargaining 
a meaningless matter of form.’54 Therefore, the contents of bargaining proposals must be 
taken into account if necessary, despite the risk of unwarranted government interference. 
This was recognised by the court in Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.55 This case referred to an earlier 
decision which stated that it is not permissible for the NLRB ‘to sit in judgment upon the 
substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.’56 The court in Reed &  Prince MfG. 
Co. agreed, but held that even though the statement is true, it is nonetheless necessary for the 
Board to look at the content of proposal because ‘if the Board is not to be blinded by empty 
talk and by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining, it must take cognizance of the 
reasonableness of the positions taken by an employer in the course of bargaining 
negotiations.57 The court also made it clear that ‘while the Board cannot force an employer 
to make a “concession” on any specific issue or to adopt any particular position, the 
employer is obliged to make some reasonable effort in some direction to compose his 
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differences with the union, if § 8(5)(a) is to be read as imposing any substantial obligation at 
all.’58 
 
6.2.4.2 Tough Bargaining and Bad Faith Bargaining 
Drawing a distinction between tough bargaining and bad faith bargaining is another 
difficulty that arises where a judicially enforced duty to bargain is imposed. This is 
especially so in those compulsory systems where there is no obligation to make proposals or 
concession. Under these systems, of which America is one, a party has a right to be adamant 
about their bargaining position and to protect it as vigorously as they possibly can. This 
position was affirmed by the court in NLRB v Herman Sausage Company.59 The court held 
that ‘if the insistence is genuinely and sincerely held, if it is not a mere window dressing, it 
may be maintained forever though it produce a stalemate.’60  
 
However, problem here is that stubbornness can also be held to evidence bad faith, 
provided it is accompanied by other evidence indicating a lack of good faith. This as was 
pointed out by the court in Chevron Oil Company v NLRB.61 It held that the NLRA clearly 
states that a party is not obliged to make any concessions and this means that ‘adamant 
insistence on a bargaining position, then, is not in itself a refusal to bargain in good faith.’62 
Therefore, it is up to the Board or the courts to determine whether a party is being legally 
adamant or whether their stubbornness  constitutes bad faith. Various factors can be relied 
on to make this determination, but the ‘prevailing view appears to be that good faith 
bargaining must be assessed by looking at the totality of the parties’ conduct and that while 
rigidness is not itself a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith, it is evidence that the 
party has not come to the bargaining table with the requisite willingness to reach 
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agreement.’63 Therefore, where an employer is stubborn with regards to their bargaining 
position, and adopts a take-it-or-leave-it position to the point that is seems that their mind 
has already made up regarding the negotiations and they are not willing to be persuaded, bad 
faith will probably be inferred. This is because it amounts to conduct on the part of the 
employers which ‘pre-empts the unions role as a partner in establishing the terms of the 
labour contract.’64 However, a take-it-or-leave-it approach is not always considered an 
indicator of bad faith. Where a party sincerely puts forward its best as well as final offer, 
after which no further negotiations are possible, bad faith will not necessarily be inferred. In 
this regard, the circumstances of each case plays an important role in the determination. 
 
From the above, it can be seen that drawing a distinction between hard bargaining and 
bad faith bargaining is a very difficult determination to make. It requires the courts and the 
Board to resolve complicated issues and this may involve the examination of the contents of 
bargaining proposals. The process therefore, requires these institutions to exercise restraint 
when making these determinations, so as to not over step the line in the bargaining 
relationship. These difficulties do not arise in systems where there is no duty to bargain as 
these systems do not rely on state intervention as they leave the regulation of collective 
bargaining matters up to the parties themselves. 
 
6.2.4.3 Remedies 
The remedies provided in circumstances where an employer has been found guilty of bad 
faith bargaining constitutes another problem area in the compulsory model of bargaining. 
The most popular remedy in countries following this model is the bargaining order. This 
remedy requires that a party who has been found guilty of bargaining in bad faith, cease and 
desist from such behaviour and immediately start bargaining in good faith. Unfortunately, it 
is a weak remedy as there are no sanctions for parties who do not comply with it. Therefore, 
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employers after being ordered to bargaining in good faith, simply continue to bargain in bad 
faith as bargaining orders allows the cycle of bargaining in bad faith to repeat itself. This is 
obviously detrimental to the bargaining process, especially in the American context, where 
unions are too weak to enforce their demands through strike action. 
 
6.2.5 Problems with the American Collective Bargaining System 
America has one of the weakest and most ineffective collective bargaining systems in the 
world. As a result, the plight of workers has worsened over the years and not much has been 
done to alleviate the position in which the country’s collective bargaining regime finds itself. 
This grim situation can partly be attributed to the way in which the NLRA is administered, 
interpreted and enforced, which has the effect of placing employees and their unions in a 
precarious position in which their rights to participate in collective bargaining, especially 
those relating to the right to freedom of association and the right to strike are compromised 
and restricted. It can also be attributed to the fact that America does not comply with its 
international obligations as the NLRA fails to promote the process of collective bargaining . 
 
Many problems arise as a consequence of the way in which the provisions of the 
NLRA are applied and interpreted. This statute, which was ‘supposed to uphold and defend 
the right to form unions, has become a Catch-22 of ineffective enforcement and interminable 
delay.’65 Both administrative and procedural delays are responsible for the suppression of 
workers rights and they undermine the bargaining process as unions might have to wait for 
years before the final determination of a dispute. These disputes can be in relation to a 
number of things ranging from an allegation of a refusal to bargain or an allegation of an 
unfair labour practice. The law and administrative policies do nothing to alleviate difficulties 
caused by the long delays. These delays are further contributed to by the fact that the NLRA 
does not provide the Board with sufficient powers to regulate these matters by itself. 
Therefore Board decisions are usually always subject to review. 
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The enforcement of the NLRA also creates difficulties as its provisions are not 
properly enforced. Therefore, employers are always violating the law as they know that most 
violations go undetected. In fact, even where there is a real possibility of being caught, the 
penalties are so minuscule that employers will often take the risk. For these reasons, 
violations of the NLRA are extreme and abundant. They go beyond firing workers for 
participating in union activities as employers often participate in other unlawful activities 
such as ‘surveillance, interrogation, unscheduled pay increases and threats of dismissal - 
without fear of facing ULP…charges.’66 These are all prohibited activities that should be 
prevented in order to protect the institution of collective bargaining because they undermine 
its successful operation by intimidating workers and preventing them from unionising.  
 
There have also been judgments handed down by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, which have interpreted certain provisions of the NLRA in a manner which is 
restrictive and oppressive to collective bargaining such as the decision which has made it 
more difficult for unions to get recognition as a bargaining agent by diverting from the 
previously held position that signed authorisation cards constituted sufficient proof of 
majority status, which has now has been made subject to the employers approval.67 The 
employer will obviously prefer the union to go through the more difficult and time-
consuming board election procedure as this affords them the opportunity to resort to tactics 
which will make the success of the union less likely. 
 
Election procedures in terms of the NLRB are also detrimental to collective bargaining 
in the United States. The procedures make it extremely difficult for unions to succeed in 
meeting the requirement for certification. The situation is so bad that the election procedure 
has been described as a ‘deathtrap for workers’ aspirations, a parody of democracy and little 
more than a platform for employer coercion.’68 It is a process characterised by extreme 
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delays before the election outcome is given, intimidation of workers so that they will be 
reluctant to vote for the union, coercion and the provision of incorrect information when a 
union request certain data from the employer. 
 
The right to strike in another problematical area of collective labour relations in the 
United States. In principal the right is protected under section 7 of the NLRA which 
basically states ‘that employees have a right to engage in concerted activity for collective 
bargaining and other mutual aid and protection and section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an 
unfair labour practice for an employer to interfere with an employee’s exercise of a right 
protected under section 7.’69 However, under the American systems it is permissible to 
replace striking workers with either permanent or non-permanent replacement labour 
according to a decision by the Supreme Court which found that an employer has the right to 
maintain the operation of his business during a strike and is therefore entitled to replace 
striking workers.70 This situation obviously has a negative impact on the bargaining regime 
in the United States as in order for the bargaining process to operate successfully it must 
ensure the adequate protection of workers embarking on legal strike action. 
 
6.2.6 Compliance with the ILO 
The United States of America has not ratified the two main ILO Conventions concerning 
collective bargaining.71 However, as an ILO Member State it is nevertheless obliged to 
promote the principles enshrined in these Conventions, as they are contained in the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. This means that, despite not 
having ratified Convention No. 87, the right to freedom of association, which includes the 
right to organise and the right to bargain collectively, should be respected and protected. 
One of the most significant problems is the fact that the right to freedom of association, the 
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right to organise and the right to strike are not adequately protected. 
 
In principle, the right to organise is protected and recognised by the NLRA ‘but when 
America’s workers seek to exercise this right today, they nearly always run into a buzz saw 
of employer threats, intimidation, coercion and outright warfare.’72 The violation of the right 
to organise is especially evidenced during election campaigns when employers are able to 
rely on many tactics to suppress workers’ rights. Some of these tactics are legal even though 
they have the effect of intimidating workers. Others are unlawful but the penalties imposed 
for taking part in such activities are so petty that it makes it ‘extremely cheap for an 
employer to illegally suppress the right to organize by firing union supporters.’73  In fact, a 
‘worker is fired or discriminated against every 23 minutes...for exercising their freedom of 
association’74 and ‘one out of every four employers illegally fires workers for union activity 
during organization campaigns.’75 The following observation has been made by Human 
Rights Watch regarding the American collective bargaining situation: 
Our findings are disturbing, to say the least. Loophole-ridden laws, paralyzing delays, 
and feeble enforcement have led to a culture of impunity in many areas of U.S. labour 
and practice. Legal obstacles tilt the playing field so steeply against workers’ freedom 
of association that the United States is in violation of international human rights 
standards for workers.76 
 
6.2.7 Final Thoughts on the American System 
America does not promote collective bargaining sufficiently in terms of its ILO 
commitments. It also does not afford adequate protection to some of the fundamental 
bargaining rights. These are the factors which have contributed to the steady decline of 
collective bargaining as a viable institution on the United States. This situation has cause 
American unions to place to much hope and emphasis on the ‘duty to bargain in seeking to 
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establish bargaining relationships, despite their lack of economic strength to stand up to 
employers and to back up their demands. These unions have no alternative but to put all 
their aspirations into this rather weak legislative duty, which is easily side-stepped by skilled 
negotiators pretending to comply with its requirements. Employers also have no incentive 
for taking these unions seriously as there is no serious threat of economic reprisals that can 
harm their business.  Therefore, employers simply fake compliance with the NLRA by going 
through the motions of bargaining.  
 
It is submitted that if unions were strong enough to exert sufficient economic pressure 
on employers, they would be less likely to bargain in bad faith. It seems therefore, that the 
problem with imposing a duty to bargain, where it is unaccompanied by a strong trade union 
movement, results in wasted time because employers have no incentive for taking unions 
seriously, which are too weak to pose a severe economic threat. Meaningful negotiations 
require the participation of two opponents worthy of each other. It cannot occur where one 
party’s power completely exceeds that of the other. The protection and promotion of the 
right to freedom of association, the right to organise, right to bargain collectively and the 
right to strike are therefore essential components in any system wishing to operate 
successfully and this is where the American systems lacks compliance. The situation can 
also be improved if collective bargaining in America more actively promoted. This can be 
done by simplifying the certification procedure, providing for first-agreement arbitration and 
making the use of replacement labour impermissible, which are issues contained in the 
Employee Free Choice Act discussed below. 
 
6.2.8 Employee Free Choice Act (H.R. 800)77 
This Employee Free Choice Act is a bill that has been introduced to the House of 
Representatives and the Senate in the Unites States. The bill proposes to deal with some of 
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the problems that arise in the American collective bargaining system as a result the poor 
enforcement of, and inadequate remedies and penalties provided for, by the NLRA. The core 
objectives that the bill aims to achieve are the following: Firstly, making the certification of 
a union possible by showing signed authorization card as opposed to requiring the union to 
go through the more difficult NLRB election procedures. Secondly, providing first-
agreement arbitration and mediation where bargaining parties to a newly formed bargaining 
relationship are unable to reach agreement on their first contract. Thirdly, by providing more 
powerful penalties where there is interference with the rights of employees to organise. 
 
This bill will greatly assist collective bargaining in the United States if enacted, but it 
remains to be seen if this will ever happen. On 1 March 2007, the bill was passed by the 
House of Representatives. Its for the Senate and the President now to make their decision 
regarding the fate of America’s workforce.  
 
6.3 Canada 
 
6.3.1 Historical Development of the ‘Duty to Bargain’ 
Collective bargaining received no support from the Canadian federal government prior to 
1944. The government took a non-interventionist approach and it was left up to workers 
themselves to establish bargaining relationships, without being provided with any of the 
basic bargaining rights such as the right to freedom of association and the right to organise. 
However, all this changed in 1944 when a need to move from this non-interventionist 
stance arose as a result of the Second World War. The war provided the perfect opportunity 
for trade unions to grow in strength as ‘the labour shortage and general economic recovery 
proved conducive to trade union organisation.’78 However, this period of growth became 
problematic as unions became stronger and their demands to be included in the decision 
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making processes became more serious while employers remained reluctant to participate in. 
This situation gave rise to high levels of industrial unrest, which could not be ignored by the 
government.  
 
The Canadian government intervened promptly to diffuse the situation. This 
intervention came in the form of the federal government relying on its wartime emergency 
powers,  permitting it to legislate on matters usually reserved for regulation by the individual 
provinces. P.C. 1003 was enacted which contained regulations dealing with collective 
bargaining. Most of these regulations were adopted from the American system as the 
American regulations provided a way in which government could promote, regulate and 
facilitate collective bargaining, through involving the state more actively in the bargaining 
process, while at the same time still providing the parties with the opportunity of concluding 
their own collective agreements. It seems therefore, that both Canada and the Unites States 
implemented the compulsory model of collective bargaining as their preferred method of 
regulation, in the belief that a more interventionist role by the government, in the regulation 
and protection of collective bargaining, would ultimately lead to a reduction in industrial 
unrest. 
 
After the war P.C. 1003 was repealed and each province was once again entitled to 
implement their own legislation regulating labour matters. They all did, but the legislation 
adopted by each provinces was rooted in the war time regulations. As a result, the provisions 
of P.C. 1003 lived on, ensuring many similarities between the different provincial statues 
adopted and giving Canadian labour law a distinctly American characteristic. 
 
6.3.2 Current Framework in Support of Collective Bargaining 
The institution of collective bargaining in Canada consists of eleven different bargaining 
systems. This number comprises the jurisdictions of the ten provinces as well as that of the 
federal sphere. However, despite the different systems, the general collective bargaining 
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approach is relatively the same, especially with the regards to the imposition of a duty to 
bargain. This makes it possible to deal with collective bargaining in Canadian generally and 
without having to refer to the positions under each of the different systems. 
 
As already mentioned, the Canadian system of collective bargaining is very similar to 
its American counterpart as many features have been adopted from the United States. Thus, 
bargaining is mostly conducted at plant level and the principles of majoritarianism and 
exclusivity are adhered to. Legislation imposes a duty to bargain in good faith on an 
employer, once the union has met all the necessary requirements. These requirements 
usually relate to the union being able to show that is has attained the support of the majority 
of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. The purpose of the duty is the 
promotion of rational and informed discussion, which helps bargaining parties to resolve 
their differences, thereby preventing unnecessary industrial action.  
 
The establishment of labour boards is another important feature of the Canadian 
system. These boards are responsible for implementing and regulating the collective 
bargaining legislation. They also deal with the certification of unions, the investigation of 
unfair labour practices and the provision of appropriate remedies where a party has been 
found guilty of violating the legislation. 
 
The right to strike is another an essential component of the collective bargaining 
regime in Canada. However, this right is limited where there is a collective agreement in 
force and also for a limited time period after a collective agreement has ended.  
 
The above American features and influences have however, been intertwined with 
distinctly Canadian features. One of these is the fact that Canadian legislation makes 
submission to conciliation a precondition to legal strike. This requirement only arises where 
the parties have reached a stalemate, having been unable to agree on terms satisfactory to 
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both sides. Conciliation can be seen as an instrument aimed at providing the parties with a 
final opportunity to resolve their dispute, before the need to resort to industrial action arises. 
Unlike the negotiations preceding conciliation, conciliation involves the introduction of a 
neutral third-party to help facilitate bargaining. This small addition has proved to be very 
useful in the bargaining dynamic as more than ‘half of all collective agreements are achieved 
with some third-party intervention.’79  
 
First-agreement arbitration is another feature imposed by several jurisdictions in 
Canada.80 It is imposed where parties to a newly established bargaining relationship are 
unable to agree to an initial collective agreement. After providing the parties with the 
opportunity to present their case, an arbitrator is entitled to impose their first collective 
agreement on them. The possibility of having the terms imposed by an arbitrator provides a 
strong incentive for reaching an agreement. It also has a strong ‘deterrent effect upon other 
employers who might be tempted to adopt anti-union tactics when bargaining.’81 Both of 
these features provide numerous advantages for unions.  
 
6.3.3 Effectiveness of the Duty to Bargain in the Canadian System of Collective 
Bargaining  
Canada’s collective bargaining system is relatively strong and much more successful than its 
American counterpart. This being so despite both systems following a more or less similar 
approach. This fact provides proof that is not the imposition of a duty to bargain that has led 
to the failure of the American collective bargaining regime, but that its failure is in fact 
attributed to a range of other factors. The factors responsible for the failure of the American 
system were mentioned above and will not be mentioned again, except where necessary to 
point out how Canada’s different approach to these factors have resulted in a much more 
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successful bargaining regime.  
 
The recognition of collective bargaining, as an important element in labour relations, 
has allowed the Canadian trade union movement to grow steadily in strength and numbers 
while in the United States union density rates are amongst the lowest in the world. This 
gives rise to an interesting situation as ‘[o]rganisational levels in Canada and the United 
States were approximately equal in 1955.’82 The greater success of collective bargaining in 
Canada can in part be attributed to the fact that Canadian legislation is much more 
supportive of unions and this is evidenced in the manner in which labour provisions are 
implemented and regulated. Certification is easier, unfair labour practices are more strictly 
regulated and penalised, the right to organise is better respected and protected and some 
jurisdictions provide for first-agreement arbitration. Employers are also much less hostile to 
trade unions and their activities. 
 
The Canadian labour boards and courts are also much more vigilant when it comes to 
protecting the right to organise and protecting employees from unfair labour practices. Both 
the ‘federal and provincial statutes are more sympathetic in encouraging union organization 
and provide more effective remedies, especially since unions are often certified without the 
need for an election.’83 In most of the provinces, unions get certified simply by showing that 
their employees make up the majority in the bargaining unit. A vote is not required and this 
makes certification easier and faster. It also decreases the likelihood of interference by the 
employer during elections. Trade unions are also normally shown greater support when only 
membership evidence is relied on as compared to when an election vote has to take place. 
This position can probably be attributed to the more informal and less threatening 
atmosphere of only requiring the show membership evidence. Only two provinces always 
require a vote, but their election procedures are faster and more shielded from unfair labour 
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practices than is the case in the United States. 
 
 Canadian labour boards are also given greater powers to investigate allegations of 
unfair labour practices and to provide effective sanctions where they are found to have 
occurred. In many jurisdictions where an employer is found guilty of interfering with 
election campaigns, to the extent that the true wishes of the employees can no longer be 
established, the union will get certified even though it might not have majority support. This 
is an extremely powerful remedy for undue interference by employers and provides a strong 
incentive for them to not interfere with union campaigns. 
 
Conciliation is another feature of Canadian collective bargaining that makes the 
process more successful. The duty to bargain gets the parties to the negotiating table so that 
they can take part in rational discussion, but they are left to their own devices and the 
statutory requirement of ‘good faith’ is seldom of any value in compelling the parties to deal 
with each other in a manner that will result in an agreement. The resort to economic 
weapons is therefore still very much relied on. But in Canada, before the parties may embark 
upon lawful industrial action, they need to refer their dispute to conciliation. This process 
involves the parties discussing their issues with each other once again, but this time it occurs 
in the presence of a neutral third-party who is there to facilitate the negotiation. This rather 
small change has proved to be very successful as experience “shows that the mere 
intervention of a neutral, independent third party, in which the parties have confidence, is 
often enough to break a stalemate which the parties would be unable to resolve 
themselves.”84  
 
Another important feature making collective bargaining more effective in Canada is 
the fact that many jurisdictions require first-agreement arbitration where a newly certified 
trade union is unable to conclude a collective agreement with the employer. As both parties 
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are normally reluctant to have an agreement imposed on them, they will usually make a 
greater effort to reach an agreement. 
 
Overall, collective bargaining in Canada operates in a much more effective, supportive 
and favourable framework and ‘effectuates the Wagner Act design more consistently than 
does the American counterpart.’85 The ‘duty to bargain in good faith’ has also attracted much 
less attention and litigation than received in the United Stated. It is submitted that the reason 
for this has to do with the fact that Canadian unions do not put all their hopes and aspirations 
in the enforcement of this duty as do the American unions. American unions are too weak to 
go on strike, so the use of economic power to attain their demands is not really an option. 
Their only hope is at the bargaining table, where their efforts are more often than not 
unsuccessful. Where an employer is found to have bargained in bad faith the NLRB simply 
orders the employer to start bargaining in good faith. However, there is nothing to prevent 
bad faith bargaining from continuing and the cycle repeats itself. At no point are the unions 
capable of breaking off negotiations and resorting to economic weapons to stop the cycle as 
they are simply too weak. This is not the case in Canada, as unions are sufficiently strong to 
constitute a worthy bargaining opponent capable of exerting pressure to enforce their 
demands. 
 
6.3.4 Difficulties Incurred by Imposing a Duty to Bargain 
Canadian collective labour relations are in a fairly good position, but this is not to say that it 
is without problems. Many of the problems experienced relate to the imposition of a duty to 
bargain in good faith. These problems will be discussed below and it will also be shown that 
the Canadian approach to dealing with some of these difficulties differs to the approach 
taken by its American counterpart. Overall, it will be seen that that the Canadian approach is 
much more simple and straightforward. 
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6.3.4.1 Determining Good Faith 
There has been much opposition and debate regarding the imposition of a duty to bargain in 
good faith in Canadian labour law. The requirement of ‘good faith’ has been described as 
‘not a part of the bargaining process and, indeed, seems impossible of attainment under the 
conditions of the existing economic system.’86 However, despite these recognised 
difficulties, all eleven Canadian jurisdictions impose a duty to bargain in good faith.  
 
The approach followed by the Canadian labour boards and courts, in determining 
whether the duty to bargain in good faith has been complied with, revolves around 
evaluating the employer’s objective conduct.  No attempt is made at establishing their actual 
subjective state of mind. The focus is on the manner in which employers conduct themselves 
during negotiations. The labour boards look for objective conduct considered to weaken the 
bargaining process as indications of bad faith. Conduct which is considered to weaken the 
bargaining process is generally conduct which prevents rational informed discussion from 
taking place. It includes a refusal to meet, certain types of actions taken away from the 
bargaining table, unsuspected changes in bargaining positions, not substantiating bargaining 
proposals, failure to supply information, misrepresentation of information and ‘surface 
bargaining’.  
 
The content of a proposal is seldom relied on in order to make a finding of bad faith. 
This will only be required if there is an allegation of ‘surface bargaining’. For this reason,  
problems arising in relation to surface bargaining will be considered separately from those 
concerning general conduct considered to weaken the bargaining process. 
 
6.3.4.1.1 Conduct Considered to Weaken the Bargaining Process 
An outright refusal to meet or placing unreasonable conditions that must be met before a 
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meeting will be agreed to, is obviously conduct which weakens the bargaining process as it 
prevents rational discussion from taking place. Where a party is guilty of such conduct, the 
boards will infer bad faith.  
 
Premature and illegal strikes threats have been held to be conduct which weakens the 
bargaining process as it indicates a lack of desire to participate in rational discussion. The 
same has been held for circumvention of the bargaining agent and unilateral changes to 
terms and conditions of employment, where no valid justifications are provided. 
 
Unforeseen changes in bargaining positions also undermine the bargaining process, as 
valuable participation in negotiation requires bargaining parties to be open about all the 
issues that need to be discussed and that these issues be placed on the bargaining table 
during the early stages of the negotiation. Where a party suddenly introduces new issues at a 
late stage of the negotiations one must be suspicious of their motives as such a tactics 
‘effectively destroys the decision-making framework.’87 
 
Reneging on a previous commitment is also considered conduct which weakens the 
bargaining process and unless there is a valid reason for reneging, a ruling of bad faith will 
be made as ‘[r]ational discussion requires that parties share the intention of narrowing 
whatever gap exists between them with a view to closing it completely. Once steps have 
been taken to narrow the gap, the onus should be on the party that backs away and 
retrenches to demonstrate that it did so with some legitimate purpose in mind….’88 
 
Canadian law requires bargaining proposals to be substantiated fully as this duty ‘is 
crucial to the notion of collective bargaining as a rational process of persuasion and this is 
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for at least three reasons.’89 These reasons are provided by Bendel as the following: Firstly, 
meaningful negotiation is only possible ‘if the premises, perspectives and factual elements 
that lie behind a position are articulated.’90 Secondly, ‘the requirement to substantiate a 
proposal makes it somewhat less likely that frivolous or untenable proposals will be made.’91 
The requirement that proposals must be substantiated also helps put a party in a better 
position to understand the other stance by requiring proposals to be explained. This helps to 
make the bargaining process more credible. Thirdly, it ensures that bargaining parties are 
‘not only entitled to know the outcome of negotiations, but, if an impasse is reached, they 
are also entitled to know why there has been a failure to agree, something which could only 
be revealed if the perspectives of each sides’ position have been fully explained.’92 The 
reasons given, for this requirement to be sufficiently met, must be honest and rational. It 
does not however, have to be reasonable. 
 
Employers will also be found guilty of bargaining in bad faith where they refuse to 
supply the union with information that is relevant to and necessary for rational and informed 
discussion. 
 
Lastly, a finding of bad faith will be made where an employer who is under a duty to 
supply a union with information, supplies the union with false information. 
 
6.3.4.2 Tough Bargaining and Bad Faith Bargaining 
The main difficulty regarding the imposition if a duty to bargain in good faith arises when 
determining whether or not a party is guilty of surface bargaining. This occurs where a 
person has already made up their mind that they have no intention to work towards reaching 
an agreement and then simply go through the motions of bargaining in order to avoid a 
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finding that they have acted in bad faith. However, as already mentioned, according to 
Canadian as well as American law, parties are permitted to be adamant when it comes to 
maintaining their bargaining positions which does not amount to bad faith. This situation 
causes the problem of having to draw a distinction between ‘hard bargaining’ and ‘surface 
bargaining’. This distinction has attracted serious criticism against imposing a duty to 
bargain in good faith because not only is it extremely difficult to make this determination 
accurately, but it also involves the labour boards having to look at the content of bargaining 
proposals. However, the content of a proposal is not by itself sufficient to draw an inference 
of bad faith according to the Toronto Typographical Union v The Daily Times. This case 
held that surface bargaining can only be inferred after a party’s cumulative conduct has been 
look at and that this examination would include looking at, but is not restricted to, the 
‘adoption of an inflexible position on issues central to the negotiations.’93 The court also 
held that it ‘is only when the conduct of the parties on the whole demonstrates that the one 
side has no intention of concluding a collective agreement, notwithstanding its preservation 
of the outward manifestations of bargaining, that a finding of “surface bargaining” can be 
made.’94  
 
This above approach is clearly problematic as it makes it possible for a party with a clearly 
unacceptable bargaining proposal, to be found to be bargaining in good faith, as long as 
there are no other indications pointing in the direction of an unwillingness to reach 
agreement.  This also enables a skilled negotiator, who has absolutely no intention of 
concluding an agreement, to pass the good faith test by going through the motions of 
bargaining. 
 
It has been suggested, that in order to overcome this difficulty, the labour boards 
‘should be prepared to hold that an employer whose contract proposals it considers 
unreasonable by reference to a particular objective standard is prima facie guilty of failing to 
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bargain in good faith’ and that a ‘similar inference should be drawn if the employer insists 
upon a proposal the possible consequence of which would lead to a deterioration in 
employees’ terms and conditions of employment.’95 Once this prima facie case is 
established, it will be the employer’s responsibility to show that his conduct is not in breach 
of his duty to bargain in good faith. 
 
6.3.4.3 Remedies 
Canadian labour boards have much wider powers to provide remedies where a breach of the 
duty to bargain in good faith has occurred. As a result a wide range of remedies are capable 
of being used as long as it does not amount to the imposition of a collective agreement on 
the parties. This wider discretion allows the boards to provide more suitable remedies where 
employers are guilty of bargaining in good faith. 
 
The situation in Canada also differs to that of America as first-agreement arbitration does 
provide a very effective remedy. It imposes a collective agreement on parties to a newly 
established bargaining relationship where they are unable to reach agreement themselves 
which provides a very strong incentive for concluding a collective agreement 
 
However, one of the most popular remedies relied on, as in the United States, has been 
an order compelling a party to bargain in good faith if they have been found guilty of bad 
faith bargaining. Despite its popularity, this remedy is actually quite useless against an 
employer determined to undermine the bargaining process.  
 
6.3.5 Problems with the Canadian Collective Bargaining System 
In general the Canadian collective bargaining system functions quite well and promotes 
collective bargaining quite effectively.  The only substantial problems seem to be those 
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incurred by imposing a duty to bargain in good faith and those resulting from the fact that 
Canadian law does not fully comply with some of its obligations in terms of the ILO. This 
section will only deal with Canada’s compliance with its ILO obligations as the difficulties 
incurred by imposing a duty to bargain in good faith have already been discussed above. 
 
6.3.6 Compliance with the ILO 
Canada is an ILO Member State and is therefore obligated to give effect to the fundamental 
principles enshrined in the ILO Declaration.96 It has also ratified Convention No. 87 and has 
signed but not yet ratified Convention No.98. However, Canada has failed to comply with its 
international obligations in two respects. The first relates to the right to freedom of 
association as provided for by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms97 which was 
contrary to the ILO standards up to 2007, and the second, relates to the exclusion of certain 
agricultural workers from participation in collective bargaining. 
 
The right to freedom of association under Canadian law did not always correspond to 
the right to freedom of association according to the ILO. Unlike the ILO, which interprets 
this right to embrace the right to bargain collectively as well as the right to strike, the 
Canadian right was prior to 2007 interpreted narrowly by the Supreme Court of Canada and 
‘in the labour context included nothing more than the right to join a trade union.’98 This 
position was affirmed by three Supreme Court decisions which have become known as the 
Labour Trilogy.99 These three decisions by the court essentially defined the right to 
collective bargaining and the right to strike as ‘modern and legislative and not 
fundamental.’100 .  
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However, the Supreme Court shifted from its position in the case of Dunmore v. 
Ontario (Attorney General).101 The Court’s decision signified a move towards an approach 
closer to that of the ILO’s as it found that some union activities were inherent in the right to 
freedom of association. This position was shifted even further in June 2007 when the 
Canadian Supreme Court handed down its judgment in Health Services & Support – 
Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia.102 The court held that the right to 
freedom of association as provided for by the Canadian Charter ‘protects the capacity of 
members of labour unions to engage in collective bargaining on workplace issues.’103 The 
stated the following in this regard: 
Our conclusion that s. 2(d) of the Charter protects a process of collective 
bargaining rests on four propositions. First, a review of the s. 2(d) 
jurisprudence of this Court reveals that the reasons evoked in the past for 
holding that the guarantee of freedom of association does not extend to 
collective bargaining can no longer stand. Second, an interpretation of s. 
2(d) that precludes collective bargaining from its ambit is inconsistent 
with Canada's historic recognition of the importance of collective 
bargaining to freedom of association. Third, collective bargaining is an 
integral component of freedom of association in international law, 
which may inform the interpretation of Charter guarantees. Finally, 
interpreting s. 2(d) as including a right to collective bargaining is 
consistent with, and indeed, promotes, other Charter rights, freedoms and 
values.104 
 
The second way in which Canada does not comply with its ILO obligations is with 
respect to the exclusion of certain workers from collective bargaining and this contravention 
of ILO standards is still applicable. In certain provinces, farm workers are excluded from 
bargaining and this has formed the basis from numerous complaints being lodged against 
Canada as in the ‘last twenty-two years, there have been some sixty-five complaints from 
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Canadian unions referred to the Committee on Freedom of Association.’105  
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CHAPTER 7: COUNTRIES ADHERING TO THE VOLUNTARY 
 MODELS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
This chapter looks at three countries which adhere to the voluntary models of collective 
bargaining and how they utilize a specific voluntary model or a combination of voluntary 
models to suit their particular needs. 
 
7.1 Germany 
 
7.1.1 The German Collective Bargaining System  
The German collective bargaining system follows the purely voluntary approach to collective 
bargaining. Bargaining occurs predominantly at sectoral level and there are no laws regulating 
the process, except for the Tarifvertragsgesetz, which only deals with collective agreements. 
This means that the law and the courts do very little to assist unions in the bargaining process. 
There is no ‘duty to bargain’ and the whole collective bargaining process as well as its 
outcomes are left up to the autonomy of the parties. 
 
However, adherence to the purely voluntary model does require the state to create 
sufficient room in which bargaining can be effectively pursued. Germany does this by 
constitutionally protecting the right to freedom of association, which has become the primary 
legal source for collective bargaining.106 Unlike the Canadian right to freedom of association, 
which has in the past been narrowly construed, the German right must be understood in the 
widest sense. It protects the right to organise, to bargain and to strike. In this sense, freedom 
of association as provided for by the German Constitution corresponds to the meaning of the 
right under the ILO Conventions. Where this right relates to ‘collective industrial 
organizations’ it may not be limited by the state or any other person or body, but in order to 
enjoy this protection, unions must meet certain requirement and these include having 
sufficient power and sufficient members. Unions are not however, required to be elected 
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before they are entitled to operate and participate in the bargaining process. 
 
The ability to exert economic pressure is a crucial part of the German system as ‘the 
requirement to posses the power to exert pressure on the respective counterpart is based on 
the assumption that the proper functioning of the autonomous system of collective bargaining 
would be undermined if powerless associations were able to participate in collective 
bargaining.’107 The right to resort to industrial action is seen as a corollary of collective 
bargaining and is therefore also protected by the right to freedom of association contained in 
the Constitution. It has also been made clear by the German courts that ‘only industrial action, 
and not judicial proceedings, can force an employer or an employer’s association to bargain 
collectively with a union.’108 
 
7.1.2 The Historical Development of the German Collective Bargaining System 
The voluntary approach to collective bargaining in Germany emerged in the same manner as 
it emerged in other countries adhering to the original voluntary model. It emerged through the 
efforts made by German workers, without any assistance being offered by the state. Workers 
did this as they were eager to protect their interests and curb the ability of employer’s to 
unilaterally change terms and conditions of employment. This effective emergence of the 
process took many years and involved many struggles. For many years it was seen as an 
illegal activity and the formation of unions and participation in their activities were 
prohibited. However, this position started to change when the ‘Industrial Code of 1869 
theoretically removed all bans on the formation of trade unions….’109 Unfortunately for 
unions, this victory did not mark the end of their struggles as they were once again banned by 
the Anti-Socialist Act of 1878. This Act remained in force for twelve years.  Only after it was 
repealed did unions begin their long and steady journey of growth and development. 
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7.1.3 The German Collective Bargaining System  
Adherence to the purely voluntary model requires that state interference in the bargaining 
process be kept to a minimum as the principles of voluntary negotiation and the autonomy of 
the bargaining parties are highly regarded. As such, the imposition of a legally enforced duty 
to bargain is a concept which is completely unheard of in German industrial relations, because 
the establishment of bargaining relationships are left up to the power of the parties 
themselves. 
 
Bargaining occurs at sectoral level between trade unions and employers’ associations. 
These associations work independently ‘from governmental influences, but still operate 
within the framework of the constitution and current legislation.’110 They conclude collective 
agreements for the whole industry which has the advantage of creating uniform terms and 
conditions of employment.  
 
The state is responsible for protecting the bare essentials that make collective 
bargaining possible and this includes providing for sufficient legal space in which the process 
can be utilised. Germany does this through Article 9 subsection 3111 of the German Basic Law, 
which has become the primary legal source for collective bargaining and constitutionally 
protects the right to freedom of association.  
 
However, in order to enjoy the protection afforded by Article 9 subsection3, 
associations must first meet certain preconditions. These preconditions are aimed at ensuring 
that the process of collective bargaining functions properly by only affording protection to 
those associations who are strong enough to participate in the process meaningfully. Unlike 
its American counterpart, the German collective bargaining regime does not come to the aid 
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of unions which are too weak to exert some kind of pressure on employers in order to 
persuade them to take part in the collective bargaining process because the German position is 
that unions, which are incapable of backing up their assertions successfully are not entitled to 
be protected in the bargaining process. This is because ‘the requirement to posses the power 
to exert pressure on the respective counterpart is based on the assumption that the proper 
functioning of the autonomous system of collective bargaining would be undermined if 
powerless associations were able to participate in collective bargaining.’112  
 
From the above, it also becomes clear that the right to resort to industrial action is 
another crucial element if the German system. It is seen as a corollary of collective bargaining 
and to this extent is has been emphasised by the German courts that ‘only industrial action, 
and not judicial proceedings, can force an employer or an employer’s association to bargain 
collectively with a union.’113 
 
7.1.4 Effectiveness of the German System 
Despite the fact that unions are not assisted by the courts or legislation, German unions have 
been able to ‘maintain their dominant role as a force in German industrial relations.’114  It is 
however true that over the past few years there has been a steady decline in union 
membership, but even so, many employees remain unionised and a majority of employers still 
belong to employers associations.  
 
The effectiveness of the system can be attributed to the strong protection of he right to 
freedom of association and the other rights embraced by this it. Germany also vigorously 
promotes collective bargaining. This has proved to be sufficient at ensuring the emergence of 
a strong and competent union movement. It has also ensured the viability of the collective 
bargaining process.  The provision of these basic rights have made it possible for employees 
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to join unions, participate in union activities and to protect their rights and interest by being 
guaranteed the right to resort to protected industrial action where it is required. These are all 
the essential elements that any collective bargaining systems requires for it to be successful. 
 
Another important element that contributes to the success of the bargaining process in 
Germany is the fact that the majority of employers belong to employer’s organisation. This 
factor contributes very strongly to the endorsement of the bargaining process as a way in 
which to determine terms and conditions of employment. Employer’s organisations afford  
employers the opportunity to work together, share financial burdens and offer one another 
support when it comes to the negotiating process. This position differs significantly from that 
in the United States, where the concept of an employers organisation is a very uncommon 
feature. In the American context, employers act alone and therefore tend to feel more 
threatened by unions, which is not the case in countries where there is support for employer’s 
organisation. Here employers tend to be more conducive to participating in the bargaining 
process as it allows them the opportunity to work together with the other in the same industry 
and allows them set industry wide wage level, which very often can work to their advantage.  
 
7.2 Austria 
 
7.2.1 The Austrian Collective Bargaining System 
This section briefly examines the Austrian collective bargaining regime. This bargaining 
regime is especially interesting, as despite being categorised as falling under the purely model 
of collective bargaining, it has certain features that create a very unique bargaining system.   
 
Austrian collective labour law is divided into the ‘law of trades representation and the 
law of works representation.’115 Trades representation consists of standards that help to 
regulate the employment relationship, rules that govern aspects relating to collective 
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agreements and laws that regulate industrial disputes. This area of collective labour law arises 
only at national level as it concerns the conclusion of collective agreements, which in Austria 
is only occurs at this level. Works representation concerns employees’ interest at the 
enterprise level, which are dealt with by works councils. It does not deal with collective 
agreements, but ‘creates organisational possibilities for the personnel in an establishment, 
giving them rights to participate in, its administration and thereby restricting the owner’s 
freedom of decision.’116 
 
As mentioned above, bargaining occurs at sectoral level which ‘is differentiated 
according to employee status (blue-collar workers and white-collar workers) and also, in the 
area of the production of goods, according to manufacturing industry… and small-scale craft 
production….’117 There are basically two associations that represent the interest of employees. 
The first is the Trade Union Federation (Österreichischer Gewerksehaftsbund) and 
membership is based on voluntary association. The second is the Labour Chambers 
(Arbeiterkammern) and membership is compulsory.  The Trade Union Federation (TUF) 
enjoys a monopoly position when it comes to representing workers and concluding collective 
agreements. The interests of employers are represented by one statutorily created employers’ 
association called the Chamber of Commerce (Bundeskammer der Gewerblichen Wirtschaft). 
Membership to this association is compulsory and ‘on acquiring the right to run a business, 
every employer automatically becomes a member of the organisation.’118 
 
Austria’s voluntary approach to bargaining means that there is not much law regulating 
the bargaining process. As with other voluntary approaches, the rights and protection of 
workers to participate in the bargaining process is ensured by the protection of the right to 
freedom of association. In this respect Austria also ensures freedom of assembly and the 
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freedom to join and form affiliations, which is guaranteed by various constitutional 
provisions. As in German law, Austrian associations must meet certain preconditions before 
they are entitled to constitutional protection and associations are only considered to be 
affiliations for labour law ‘if their aim is to influence the employment conditions of the 
participants and, if need be, to regulate them, as well as to look after and protect the interest 
of the participating employers and employees in connection with employment matters.’119 
 
Another interesting aspect of the Austrian system is that it ‘recognises no subjective 
right of either employees or employers to take industrial action’.120 However, ‘neither special 
penal provisions nor provisions in private law forbid strikes, lock-outs or boycotts.’121 Strikes 
are therefore neither prohibited nor protected, which means that when a particular strike 
occurs, its lawfulness must be determined ‘according to the totality of law.’122 Thus, it can be 
seen that the Austrian system more or less complies with the general features of collective 
bargaining systems.   
 
7.2.2 Effectiveness of the Austrian System 
Austria enjoys the highest rate of collective bargaining coverage in the world which is 
somewhere in range of 98 per cent and 99 per cent.123  This high coverage rate would suggest 
that the overall effectiveness of the Austrian bargaining system is good, but this could be a bit 
deceiving as the high rate can be attributed to various factors, not all of which have to do with 
a bargaining system that operates well. Some of these factors include the following: Firstly, 
the fact that collective agreements are binding on both union and non-union members of a 
sector and the fact that they may even be extended to cover employers not falling under its 
scope of the agreements application. Secondly, membership to the Chamber of Commerce is 
compulsory and therefore most employers are members of this association. Thirdly, the TUF 
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enjoys a monopoly of power in the bargaining process and most private sectors employees are 
members. This means that the TUF concludes agreements for a majority of workers in the 
workforce. As can be seen from this, the high coverage rate has a lot to do with the fact that 
collective bargaining agreements are extended to non-unionised members and the fact that all 
employers belong to the employers’ organisation. 
 
Another factor contributing to the successfulness of the Austrian system is the overlap 
between leadership in the TUF and the national government. This means that trade unions 
leaders are always in a position to have their concerns heard and are also able to exercise 
some influence with parliamentary leadership, which makes it easier to represent the interests 
of union members and to have these interests protected and enforced through law. In fact, the 
TUF is provided with two different ways in which to realise it aims. It can either impose its 
aims by statute, in the Nationalrat (National Council) through the Federal Minister of Social 
Administration, a position which has since 1945 been occupied high-ranking official in the 
TUF, or it can impose its aims through implementing collective agreements.  
 
Membership of works councils and trade unions also overlap creating even stronger ties 
between all the parties in the bargaining system. The overlap between the TUF and 
Nationalrat ensures that the process of implementing terms and conditions of employment and 
the regulation of other matter occurs much faster and more efficiently. However, it also means 
that there is a much greater risk of government pursuing its own objectives and relying on this 
overlap in membership to legitimise it. On the other hand, the overlap between trade union 
members and works council members ensure communication between the national and 
enterprise level and this ‘integration of personnel extensively prevents differences of 
opinion….’124 These factors ensure that the Austrian system of collective bargaining is 
characterised strong bonds and coherence making the system effective and preventing the 
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occurrence of industrial actions. 
 
7.2.3 Compliance with the ILO 
Austria has ratified both Convention No. 87 and Convention No. 98 and it is therefore under a 
duty to comply with the requirements as set out by the Conventions. The main issue that 
arises in respect of Austria’s compliance with its ILO obligations is in terms of Convention 
No. 87. This is due to the fact that despite the right to freedom of association being 
guaranteed by the Austrian Constitution, under the Austrian collective bargaining regime 
there is only one association responsible for concluding agreements on behalf of employees. 
Despite this situation, it has been stated that Austrian law is on line with Convention No. 87 
and it is submitted that in principal this position is absolutely correct. However, the reality of 
the Austrian situation makes it very difficult to exercise the right to freedom of association 
fully, as explained below.  
 
The TUF is the only union federation in Austria and most unions fall under its umbrella. It 
most certainly occupies a monopoly position as close to ‘60 per cent of all Austrian 
employees are organised as members of the ÖGB, and of the employees organised into 
unions, the ÖGB embraces over 98 per cent!’125 This is as a result of the fact that it is the only 
organisation which is capable of representing the interests of workers and which is capable of 
concluding collective agreements on their behalf. However, this situation is not imposed by 
Austrian law, but has developed naturally since 1945. Employees are in essence, guaranteed 
the right to freedom of association as provided by the Austrian Constitution. They are 
permitted to establish or join associations of their choosing, but as can be seen from the 
above, this is not really possible as the TUF enjoys a dominant position in the bargaining 
arena and is the only association capable of concluding collective agreements. The conclusion 
of collective agreements are the ultimate aim of the bargaining process. Therefore, what use is 
the freedom to form a union or even to join, without the ability to conclude these agreements. 
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7.3 South Africa  
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
South Africa’s collective bargaining regime follows a voluntary approach. However, its 
approach is interesting and unique as it combines features of two different voluntary models. 
It provides for machinery to facilitate and promote bargaining and it also requires compulsory 
conciliation as a precondition to legal industrial action.  
 
 
7.3.2 The Historical Development of the South African Collective Bargaining System 
South Africa’s current labour law regime is relatively new. The previous Labour Relations 
Act126 was repealed and replaced with a new one just over twelve years ago. This was done to 
signify the move away from apartheid policies and to bring the country’s labour regime in 
line with the new era of democracy. Therefore, in order to acquire a proper understanding of 
the current LRA’s treatment of collective bargaining, and the specific issues which it seeks to 
address, it is necessary to be familiar with the previous regime’s regulation of labour and the 
social and political circumstances under which it operated.  
 
As with the new Act, the previous Act also favoured voluntarism. It contained no express 
duty to bargain and the regulation of the bargaining process was left primarily up to the 
parties to decide. However, the Act operated during a period in which South Africa was 
characterized by segregation, inequality and unrest and a dual system of labour relations 
operated during this period, which was ‘primarily brought about by the exclusion of pass-
bearing African workers from the statute’s definition of “employee”, and therefore from 
membership of registered trade unions, from direct representation on industrial councils and 
                                                          
126
    Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73
from using conciliation boards.’127  
 
By the late 1970’s the government set up the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry in order 
to deal with the above situation as it was being unbearable due to industrial unrest. The 
Commission’s task was to make recommendations which could be implemented as soon as 
possible in order to deal with the problems causing the conflict in the labour force. One 
important recommendation that was made and accepted was that African workers be 
permitted to become members of registered trade unions as well as being allowed 
representation on industrial councils. This recommendation was accepted which resulted in 
the demise of the dual system of labour relations. These changes signified a radical departure 
from previous policies, but did not end the plight of African workers and their unions as many 
‘employers were reluctant to recognise them as legitimate representatives of their workforces; 
they were seen as unwelcome interlopers.’128 Many employers simply refused to bargain with 
these newly formed unions and this resulted in even higher levels of industrial strife. 
 
It is in the above context that the Industrial Court felt the need to step into the bargaining 
arena, despite the Act’s preference for the principle of voluntarism. The court recognised the 
need to reduce the turmoil present in the country’s labour relations regime and it also saw the 
social benefits which could be provided by orderly collective bargaining. Fortunately for the 
Industrial Court it also had the means to intervene. This was provided by the court’s very 
wide unfair labour practice jurisdiction, as the ‘definition of unfair labour practice, focusing 
as it did on practices which had the effect, inter alia, of creating or promoting labour unrest or 
detrimentally affecting the relationship between employer and employee, was broad enough 
to include within its scope a deliberate spurning by an employer of the overtures of a 
representative union.’129 The court clearly believed that it was necessary to use this power in 
order to minimise labour unrest and also to assist the trade unions who were in much weaker 
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position than the employers to compel a bargaining relationship. This was the only way in 
which the extreme power imbalances between employees and employers could be levelled out 
while at the same time reducing the need for employees to embark on strike action in order to 
enforce their demands.  
 
7.3.3 The Current South African Collective Bargaining Framework 
The new LRA clearly favours a voluntary process in that it ‘seeks to secure only the means of 
collective bargaining, without prescribing, or empowering the courts, to prescribe, how these 
means should be exercised.’130 However, unlike the 1956 Act, the courts no longer have the 
capacity to intervene in bargaining disputes. This is as a result of the definition of an ‘unfair 
labour practice’ being severely restricted by the new Act to include only certain specified 
conduct ‘arising between an employer and employee.’131 However, this change does not mean 
that the new Act is any less enthusiastic about collective bargaining. On the contrary, it 
creates a strong framework in support of it, which makes the need for a duty to bargain 
redundant. It provides organizational rights, the guarantee of freedom of association, the 
protection of the right to strike and the provision of machinery to promote collective 
bargaining.  
 
However, despite this, many claims have been made that new LRA is unconstitutional as it 
does not provide for a duty to bargain. These claims arise from the fact that the South African 
Constitution in Section 23 provides for a ‘right to engage in collective bargaining’132 and this 
has been held to envisage the imposition of a duty to bargain.  However, as was pointed out 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in SANDU v Minister of Defence, 133  section 23 only requires 
statutory support for collective bargaining and a duty on the State not to take any action which 
prohibits it. Therefore, cannot be relied on to impose a duty to bargain on an employer. The 
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Court, per Justice Nugent, made it clear that a ‘right to engage in collective bargaining is of 
little account without an effective means of inducing an opposing party to bargain.’134 
However, the court held that in South Africa the means by which the Constitution protects 
bargaining and the means to induce it ‘is by entrenching the right to strike, thereby excluding 
a simultaneous right to judicial intervention to regulate the bargaining process.’135 
 
The LRA’s voluntaristic approach means that it is still left up to the power of the 
relevant parties and their right to resort to either a strike or a lockout to determine what 
happens in respect of a struggle relating to collective bargaining. However, the new Act made 
a very significant improvement in respect of the ongoing power struggle between employers 
and employees. It took into account the fact that employees where in a more vulnerable 
position than their employers, and for this reason the it implemented measures to ensure that 
the position of employees and their trade unions were strengthened. The position created by 
the current Act is therefore, at the same time both similar and different to that which was put 
in place by its predecessor. This is indicated by the following statement: 
It is quite evident that the Act vigorously pursues a policy of abstentionism in 
relation to the bargaining process and its outcome. To that extent, its underlying 
philosophy is no different from that of its predecessor. However, the premises 
upon which the new Act’s abstentionist stance is founded differ fundamentally 
from those which informed the 1956 Act. Whereas the latter regulated the 
bargaining process without regard for the disparities which exist in the rights and 
sanctions of management and organised labour, the new Act sets out to establish 
greater balance of power between the parties in order to ensure a more effective 
bargaining process, greater stability and more balanced outcomes.’136 
 
The above statement is important as it indicates one of the reasons why the absence of a 
duty to bargain from the LRA is not  conspicuous. The motivation behind this absence is that 
the new LRA attempts to establish a more even balance of power between trade unions and 
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employers by guaranteeing unions organisational rights in order to assist them to compel 
bargaining relationships with employers rather than imposing a duty to bargain. These rights 
‘make it possible for a trade union to build up, consolidate and maintain a power-base of 
sufficient strength among the employers’ employees’137 and this is crucial since collective 
bargaining under the Act still depends largely on the strength of the parties. It ‘is only once 
the union has attained sufficient strength’ with the assistance of these organisational rights 
that ‘it can exercise sufficient economic power on the employer to bargain on wages and other 
terms and conditions of employment.’138 All that is required from trade unions before they are 
guaranteed these rights are that they have reached the required level of representivity and that 
they are registered.139 It is therefore no longer necessary for unions to strike in order to obtain 
these rights as was the position under the 1956 Act. This change in position was referred to by 
the Labour Court in FEDCRAW v Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd.  The court held that in the 
past when a trade union desired organisational rights it was ‘preceded and often obtained by 
industrial action’ but as our ‘system of labour relations matured, the social partners agreed to 
remove this cause of conflict and to focus on the exercise of these rights rather than on their 
attainment.’140 The Constitutional Court also dealt with these rights in NUMSA v Bader Bop 
(Pty) Ltd where it held that the LRA confers these rights upon representative unions and that 
the ‘effect of this is that representative unions are entitled as of right to these organisational 
rights - they need not bargain for them.’141  
 
The South African approach ensures a voluntary process while at the same time providing 
employees and their unions with much needed assistance in order to level the playing field 
when it comes to collective bargaining. It avoids the necessity of a statutory duty to bargain 
which if relied on would once again mean that collective bargaining develops in ‘a context of 
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legalism at the expense of voluntarism, innovation and industry level organisation.’142 That is  
the situation the new Act seeks to avoid, as it results in ‘a confused jurisprudence in which 
neither party is certain of its rights and in which economic outcomes are imposed on parties 
which often bear little, if any, relation to the needs of the parties or the power they are capable 
of exerting.’143  The absence of a statutory duty to bargain also provides more flexibility in the 
labour market as the ‘fundamental danger in the imposition of a legally enforced duty to 
bargain and the consequent determination by the judiciary of levels of bargaining, bargaining 
partners and bargaining topics, is the rigidity which is introduced into a labour market that 
needs to respond to a changing economic environment.’144 These organisational rights are 
therefore, a vital component of the framework created by the new Act in support of collective 
bargaining. Without them, unions would be in a very precarious position in trying to enforce a 
bargaining relationship with employers who do not wish to bargain, as there would be 
absolutely nothing besides industrial action, to assist them in attaining the power that they 
need on order to successfully represent their members interests. These rights are a ‘necessary 
corollary to the LRA’s voluntarist approach, and provide trade unions with the essential 
instruments for not only securing an organisational foothold in the employer’s business, but 
also laying the foundations for a future collective bargaining relationship with the 
employer.’145   
 
The right to strike is another very important feature of the new LRA’s framework in 
support of collective bargaining. It is seen as ‘a union’s most appropriate response to an 
employer’s refusal to bargain with it.’146 As the courts no longer have the capacity to influence 
bargaining outcomes, the parties must rely on their own power to influence outcomes and 
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‘that power is underpinned by the organizational rights conferred by part A of chapter III of 
the Act, and the right to collective action conferred by chapter V.’147 The right to strike 
obviously plays a pivotal part in the framework of the Act and therefore, the Act ‘has 
extended and bolstered the right’ thereby ensuring that employees finding it necessary to 
resort to this right in order to ‘back up their demands’ are sufficiently protected.148 This 
protection afforded to employees was referred to by the Labour Appeal Court in SA Chemical 
Workers Union v Afrox Ltd. The court held that ‘section 5(1) of the LRA prohibits 
discrimination against an employee for exercising any right conferred by the LRA. Section 
67(4) states that an employer may not dismiss an employee for participating in a protected 
strike or for any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a protected strike.’149 However, 
employees participating in a protected strike may be dismissed for misconduct or operational 
requirements in terms of section 67(5). In order for this protection to apply section 64(1) of 
the LRA has to be complied with. It requires that the ‘issue in dispute first be referred to a 
council or to the Commission’ for conciliation and that written notice of a proposed strike be 
given ‘as the use of power should be a last resort.’150 The Labour Court in Picardi Hotels Ltd  
v Food & General Workers Union held that another implication of a protected strike is that 
‘no civil or legal proceedings arising out of the strike or conduct in contemplation or in 
furtherance of the strike, may be instituted unless they are in respect of conduct which 
constitutes a criminal offence.’151   
 
In the case of a refusal to bargain dispute there is an extra requirement that must be met. 
A refusal to bargain dispute includes a refusal to either recognise a union as a collective 
bargaining agent or a refusal to establish a bargaining council, withdrawing recognition, the 
resignation of a party from a bargaining council or a dispute about appropriate bargaining 
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levels, units or subjects.152 Before notice is given in such a dispute in terms of subsection (1) 
(b) or (c), it is necessary that an advisory award must have been prepared in terms of section 
135(3)(c) of the LRA. This award is not binding, however, non-compliance could have ‘the 
effect of legitimising or stigmatising any industrial action that might follow, depending on the 
terms of the award.’153  
 
7.3.4 Features of the South African Voluntary System 
 
7.3.4.1 Compulsory Conciliation 
Section 64(1) imposes the compulsory conciliation requirement. The parties are expected to 
discuss their issues at conciliation in the hope that they will be able to resolve their 
differences. The process makes use of a neutral third-party whose task it is to facilitate the 
meeting. Essentially conciliation serves the same purpose as ‘the duty to bargain’ as the 
parties are compelled to come together at the bargaining table before they may move on to the 
next step being industrial action. However, this approach offers more advantages than the 
‘duty to bargain’ does as the parties are not left to their own devices. The presence of a 
facilitator greatly assists meaningful negotiations. Parties are also not required by statute to 
bargain in good faith. If they take part in the conciliation process in bad faith and no 
agreement is reached, the next step is simply to go on strike. This saves time as there is no 
need for an order compelling the party in breach to commence bargaining in good faith.  
 
7.3.4.2 Machinery to Promote Bargaining 
The South African framework in support of collective bargaining also adheres to the 
voluntary approach requiring the provision of machinery that facilitates and promotes 
collective bargaining. The LRA ‘sets up an integrated framework in which organized labour 
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and management may engage one another over the full range of industrial issues.’154  The 
framework of the Act basically provides for bargaining to occur in the following forums: 
Firstly, NEDLAC (the National Economic Development and Labour Council). This is 
considered to be the top bargaining forum. It is ‘quadripartite in nature, drawing in 
representatives of the state, business, labour and civil society.’155 Secondly, the act makes 
provision for bargaining councils. This statutory bodies can be created by registered trade 
unions and employers’ association for a specific sector. They provide parties with a forum in 
which to conclude collective agreements. They also allow for the establishment procedures 
aimed at helping the parties to settle disputes. Thirdly, a union who has at least thirty percent 
support within a particular sector can apply for the establishment statutory council. However, 
these councils to not partake in the collective bargaining process. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examined four different models of collective bargaining with reference to the 
bargaining regimes of five specific countries. It was pointed out that the inherent features of 
the bargaining process, namely that of adaptability and flexibility, combined with the fact that 
it serves a variety of advantageous functions have ensured that the process has expanded in 
acceptance and popularity to the point where it is a common feature of many industrialised 
market economies, albeit in different styles and forms. These different styles and forms have 
resulted in the emergence of different bargaining models which have their own ways of 
regulating and promoting the bargaining process. After examining these four different models 
and their characteristic features it was illustrated that all the models have three common 
features that are essential to their effective operation. The three features were identified as the 
protection of the right to freedom of association, the freedom to bargain collectively and the 
right to strike.  
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that all bargaining models, irrespective of whether they adhere 
to the compulsory or voluntary approach to collective bargaining must give adequate 
protection to the above essential elements if they are to regulate and promote collective 
bargaining effectively. When an element is inadequately protected, the result is a defective 
collective bargaining regime incapable of serving those functions it was designed to serve. It 
is for these reason that the ILO has emphasised the importance of the elements by entrenching 
them in the various ILO Conventions as well as the ILO Declaration. However, as was 
indicated by this paper, not all countries comply with their commitments in terms of the ILO 
and many states, whether they adhere to the compulsory or voluntary model of bargaining, 
continue to regulate and promote the collective bargaining process in a manner that fails to 
meet ILO standards. 
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